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SECRET

COPIED BY EUROPEAN THEATER OFFICE 16 May 1944

REPORT
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL
OSS, ETO

SECRET

SECRET**SUMMARY ANALYSIS**

<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>% OF OSS TOTAL</u>
Working or intended for work behind enemy lines	426	19
Field Staffs	333	14
Base Operations (Headquarters, Communications, Air Dispatch, Packing Station, Training Installations)	693	40
Research & Analysis	117	6
Administration	481	21
	<hr/> 2250	<hr/> 100

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SECRET**BRANCH ANALYSIS**

CLASSIFICATION	HQ COMM SERV(SER) SI RAA HQ X-2				FIELD			
	PHOTO MU DO							
Working or intended for work behind enemy lines	35%				49%	2%		41%
Field Staffs	11%	18%			32%	33%	42%	61%
Base Operations (Hq., Comm., Air Dispatch, Pack Station, Training Installations)	51%	81%			8%	42%	39%	31%
Research & Analysis					91%			
Administration	3%	1%	100%	11%	9%	22%	26%	8%
Personnel on Hand	826	429	357	249	128	90	86	36
% of Total Strength	37%	19%	16%	11%	6%	4%	4%	2%
								1%
								1%

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DETAILED ANALYSIS**SECRET**PERSONNEL OR INTENDED FOR WORK BEHIND ENEMY LINES - 426

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>% OF BRANCH TOTAL</u>
SO	290	35
SI	121	49
NU	13	41
MO	2	2
TOTAL	426	% of total OSS ----- 19

FIELD STAFF - 333

SO	88	11
SI	80	32
COMM	77	18
X-2	36	42
MO	30	33
FIELD PHOTO	22	61
TOTAL	333	% of total OSS ----- 14

BASE OPERATIONS (HEADQUARTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AIR DISPATCH, PACKING STATION, TRAINING INSTALLATIONS) - 893

SO	423	52
COMM	346	81
MO	38	42
SI	20	8
X-2	28	33
NU	15	47
FIELD PHOTO	11	31
DO	12	71
Total	893	% of total OSS ----- 40

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RESEARCH & ANALYSIS - 117**SECRET**

R&A	117		91
TOTAL	117	% of total OAS	6

ADMINISTRATION - 481

SRV	345		100
SI	25		11
SO	25		3
X-2	22		26
NO	20		22
R&A	11		9
SECURITY	12		100
COMM	6		1
DO	5		29
NU	4		12
FIELD PHOTO	3		8
TOTAL	481	% of total OAS	21

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Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : General William J. Donovan
 FROM : European Theater Officer
 SUBJECT: Comments on the SO Organization in ETO

DATE: 6 May 1944

At the request of Mr. Cheston, I am submitting the following comments on the SO organization in ETO. During my recent assignment to ETO I studied the organization and operational plans of each Branch, and became acquainted with their personnel. As a result of this study, I concluded in general that:

(a) Opportunities exist for all Branches to employ profitably additional personnel.

(b) The allocation of personnel to SO has been relatively generous, both in numbers and ranks, as compared to the allocation to the Intelligence Branches.

ALLOTMENT OF PERSONNEL TO SO IN ETO

More than one-half the total personnel of OSS in ETO is either assigned to or working under the direction of SO. This is shown by the following table:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
SO Allotment	238	518	756
OG'S	19	85	104
Communications (Station Charles)	16	218	234
Services	---	46	46
Totals	273	867	1,140

As of this date, the breakdown of ranks and grades in the SO allotment and the vacancies existing are as follows:

OFFICERS

	<u>Col.</u>	<u>Lt. Col.</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Capt.</u>	<u>1st Lt.</u>	<u>2nd Lt.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Allotment	4*	9	38	68	59	62	240
Assigned against Allotment	1	2	24	59	68	37	191
Vacancies	3*	7	14	9	9	25	49
Total Allotment for ETO	9	23	80	148	142	127	529

* This includes 2 Col. vacancies awarded Chief of Mission for SO.

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ENLISTED MEN

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	M/Sgt	1st Sgt	T/Sgt	C/Sgt	T/1	Sgt	T/4	Cpl	T/5	Pfc	Pvt	Total
Allotment	12	21	24	7	24	40	28	33	34	35	260	518
Assigned against Allotment	3	3	7	16	45	26	12	26	21	74	270	503
Vacancies	9	18	17	-9	-21	14	16	7	13	-39	-10	15
Total Allotment for ETO	31	42	69	55	59	105	81	187	188	165	579	1,561

Of the 47 Officer vacancies, I believe a minimum of 25 are required for commissioning of agents who are either civilians or enlisted men.

A number of vacancies exist in field grade ranks either for promotions or for recruiting of additional personnel. Only one colonel is assigned at present, though I understand promotions will likely be requested for Lt. Col. Jackson (in charge of SO staffs at FUSAG and First and Third Armies) and Lt. Col. Bartlett (Deputy Chief and Liaison Officer between SO Headquarters and G-3 SHADE). Five of the 7 Lt. Col. vacancies are being used for promotions of Major Bress (Executive Officer), Major Canfield (Chief of Planning Section), and Major Embury (in charge of Supplies), Major Gable (Chief of Air Operations Section), Major Chandler (CO of the Packing Station).

In my judgment OSS is not justified in assigning either additional personnel or additional ranks to SO ETO. Other branches have a relatively greater need for additional personnel. A special problem exists with respect to grades for the Jedburgh W/T operators. Under the present T/O approximately one-half of these can be promoted to M/Sgt or 1st/Sgt. The others can be promoted only to T/Sgt.

In considering the military personnel supporting SO operations in ETO, it is to be remembered the Air Force personnel assigned to the 801st (provisional) Bomber Group, which operates solely at the direction of SO/BOE Headquarters, totals 1,400 Officers and EM. This will be doubled if two additional squadrons are assigned to the 801st Bomber Group.

ORGANIZATION OF SO/BOE IN ETO

SO/BOE are integrated into one operating organization in ETO. SO is a junior partner in this organization. This role is the result of fewer operating agents, a smaller number of headquarters personnel, and fewer personnel in positions responsible for formulation of policy and important operating decisions.

To understand the relative position of SO in the combined SO/BOE operation it is necessary to examine the organizational set-up. The SO/BOE Headquarters can be separated into five parts:

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6 May 1944

- (1) Offices of the Chiefs of SO and SOE.
- (2) Country Sections coordinated by regional co-directors.
- (3) A Planning Staff responsible for longer range plans and the coordination of SO/SOE plans with those of G-3 and with those of other Allied organizations.
- (4) An Air Operations Division responsible for direction and coordination of the packing and delivery of supplies and the introduction and removal of personnel from enemy-occupied territory.
- (5) A Supply and Service Section, the principal task of which is the planning and coordination of supply requirements and the procurement of supplies.

In addition to the Headquarters Staff, Field Personnel include agents and the SO/SOE staffs with Airles and Army Groups.

Offices of the Chiefs

The Chiefs are assisted by Deputy Chiefs and Executive Officers. The SOE representatives in every instance outrank the corresponding officers in SO.

Importance of the Country Sections

The detailed administrative direction of SO/SOE activity on a day-to-day basis is initiated largely in the Country Sections. SO appears to be represented only to a minor degree in these Country Sections. Thus, two French Sections exist. One consists of resistance networks organized and led by either English or American representatives introduced into French territory (this system is the more important). The other consists of resistance networks organized and led by the French resistance movement (the security of this latter system is considered to be weak).

SOE representatives are in charge of both French Sections, though Major Van Der Sticht, as Co-Director of the Western European Division, evidently spends much time on French matters. SOE representatives are also in charge of the Belgium or Dutch Sections. Captain Winkleshorn participates in the direction of the Danish Section, though his authority undoubtedly suffers by the fact SO has not produced agents for Denmark. Likewise, because of a lack of agents and for other reasons with which you are familiar, SO has never held a position of leadership in the Scandinavian Section. The chief contribution of SO to date in this Section was the furnishing of 3 SO craft (received by SOE from the Navy) for operations planned and implemented by SOE and the Norwegians.

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The coordination of the activities in the regional sections in the Western European Division is under the supervision of Regional Co-Directors. Major Van Der Stricht serves as the American Regional Co-Director along with a British opposite. As you know, the position of Major Van Der Stricht is one of considerable authority, and he appears to have an effective working relationship with his British opposite in which responsibility for important decisions is a joint matter.

The Central European Section is small, and SO is only beginning its participation. Mr. Stuart Hermann, the SO representative on the German Desk, already is working closely with the SOE Chief of this Section. Additional personnel for management of Central European activities is being sent to London and SO should become effectively represented over the next few months.

The Planning Section

In work of the Planning Section, SO/SOE apparently encounters the same problems in relating plans to day-to-day operations that arise in all large organizations. The Planning Section consists of both English and American representatives and acts in the manner of a joint Secretariat for Brig. Mockler-Perryman and Colonel Haskell. It is my understanding proposals for new operations are all considered by the Planning Section. Moreover, the American-British Co-Directors of the Planning Section are in constant touch with G-3, SHAEP, and with Planning Sections of other Allied organizations whose operations are related to those of SO/SOE. In this way the SO/SOE Planning Section performs a more broad coordinating function.

A certain amount of criticism is heard of the type of personnel on the SO planning staff. A number of the men were not initially, at least, qualified experts on Western Europe. Nor are they of the same character as those with whom R&A manned its unit engaged in servicing the Air Forces.

It was my impression the work of the planning staff is now reduced, since direction of SO/SOE activities over coming months will come more and more from G-3 at the SHAEP, Army Group, and Army levels.

Air Operations Section

Air Operations Headquarters are under Major (soon to be Lt. Col.) Gable and a British Co-Director of the Division. The CO of the Packing Station is Major (soon to be Lt. Col.) Chandler. The whole SO Air Operations Division appears well managed and is running efficiently. Favorable comment is heard on all sides. Capacity of the Packing Station is 6,000 containers monthly as compared with an original planned capacity (with approximately the same personnel of 320 EM and 16 Officers) of 2,500 containers. For a rate of operation as of April, the Packing Station is over-manned. However, as

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additional air lift is expected, it is not planned to decrease the number of packing personnel. The British had not anticipated OSS operating the station at capacity until May. Though operated only during part of March, 2,600 containers were packed.

A new program for introducing and removing personnel from enemy-occupied territory is to be started in May. OSS is to be allocated C-47 aircraft for the purpose (only one plane is to be used for a trial operation). A large number of Air Force personnel now in France await such transportation.

Supplies

Supply requirements and procurement are under the direction of Major Embury, who is regarded as the outstanding Supply Officer in OSS, ETO. In the future, Major Embury will have additional responsibility incurred as a result of the new supply arrangements whereby OSS bears certain responsibility for SOE supplies furnished under lend-lease.

Field Staffs

SO/SOE operations are to be coordinated with general military operations in Western Europe through SO/SOE Field Staffs attached to Headquarters of each Army and Army Group. Staffs with each Army total 13 officers and 20 EM, while staffs with Army Group include 7 officers and 14 EM. SO personnel have staffs attached to American Headquarters and SOE undertakes representation with British Headquarters. SO will have one officer stationed with SOE Staff at British Army Group Headquarters, and SOE has a similar arrangement with American Army Group.

SO Field Staffs are all organized and have been in training for several months. It is reported they showed well in maneuvers during March and early April. The staff with First Army was attached to that Army April 15.

Lt. Col. Jackson is Chief of SO Field Staffs and initially is Chief of SO Staff with First Army. Major Powell is Chief of SO Staff to be stationed with Third Army. When FUEAG becomes activated, Lt. Col. Jackson will become Chief of SO Army Group Staff.

(a) Additional Armies

It was reported that two American Armies in addition to the First and Third will be formed in England over coming months. SO expects to be asked to contribute staffs to these Armies. Personnel for such staffs may be available from the present allotment providing the allotment is distributed more efficiently within SO than it now is.

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6 May 1944

AGENT PERSONNEL

Underlying the junior partner character of SO in its relationship with SOE is the relatively small number of agents SO has in the field. By the middle of April SO had contributed 18 agents to the direction and coordination of resistance activity in France. Approximately 11 additional agents were to be ready for introduction before the first of June, all of whom I believe are for France. I do not know the total number of British agents in France, but apparently it is many times that of SO. Moreover, SO has no agents in Belgium, the Lowlands, Denmark, or Scandinavia. The Brewer Mission in Stockholm (which now consists of four persons) has been preparing the ground for SO operations in Denmark and Norway. However, such operations can only be effective if supported by supplies and personnel provided by air lift from England. Under present priority directives from SHAEF, such air lift probably cannot be allocated. Insofar as the Brewer Mission's primary aim of penetrating Germany is concerned, information to date indicates little has been accomplished.

It is to be emphasized the large number of British representatives in Western and Northwestern Europe, as compared to SO representatives, accounts in considerable part for the impression that the British are providing the great bulk of assistance to the resistance movements in Western Europe. The fact some supplies bear American trade marks and others carry English trade marks probably is of secondary importance. With the exception of an English trade mark so small as to be almost indistinguishable, no identification appears on the containers. Moreover, the nationality of aircraft dropping supplies and personnel to reception parties must also be of minor importance. Unless the United States publicizes the fact it is assisting resistance groups, the large number of British liaison officers (combined with British publicity concerning such aid) probably will continue to leave the impression Great Britain furnishes the great proportion of assistance to resistance groups in Europe. American liaison with the French will of course be improved in certain areas after the Jedburgh teams are introduced.

CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING JOINT SO/SOE RELATIONSHIP IN ETO

Though, as pointed out above, OSS is a junior partner in the SO/SOE relationship, the following conclusions appear justified:

- (1) An independent SO organization in Western Europe based on England would have been extremely difficult to operate. The nature of the activity sooner or later would have required integration of the headquarters. Experience in Algiers strengthens this conclusion.
- (2) SO organized slowly in ETO. Until the autumn of 1943 the SO staff in ETO was small. In January of 1944 one agent had been introduced on the continent from ETO.

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6 May 1944

(3) The British had a full-grown organization with personnel trained and tested in the management of resistance operations at a time SO was only starting its organization. This naturally has added to the seniority position of SOE.

(4) The relatively small number of agents SO has supplied to ETO has produced an organization in the field that is largely British. Introduction of the Jedburgh teams will expand American representation.

(5) The present stage of SO/SOE operations is such that it does not appear feasible to procure, educate, and have accepted on an equal basis additional management personnel in the Country Sections of Western Europe. This is not the case, however, with possible SO activities in Central Europe. Colonel Haskell is aware that additional opportunity exists in Central European sections and is expanding these sections.

(6) The present allotment of SO in ETO is large relative to the Intelligence Branches. The need of the latter for additional personnel is greater than SO, particularly inasmuch as SO is over-manned in certain sections at the present time.

(7) Operations of the Norwegian OG's are under direction of SO. At the present time no definite plan for utilizing these groups has been accepted. They are being held as operational reserves for SO if no other operation is undertaken by them.

John D. Wilson

John D. Wilson
European Theater Officer

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. Gen. W. J. Donovan
FROM: London Desk
SUBJECT: Progress Report on SI Training for General Donovan

DATE: 16 March 1944

We are forwarding herewith Progress Report on SI Training, a memorandum prepared by Major Cohen.

E. Brooks, Jr.

Attachment
S-008-302

EBJ

SECRET

OER Form 2202

FROM:

S E C R E T

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd. SA.....

MAR 74 1944.

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
ETO				abc/	
1. Burke	1037	3/16	3/16	E.B.	
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer Designations should be used in To column.
 Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20440)

S E C R E T

By Airpouch

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT ^{Equal}
Office of Strategic Services
ETOUSA

S-008-302

SA-1439

SECRET & SECRET

2 March 1944

O-15-1 mcdh
Cohen

From: Wm. P. Maddox, Major, AUS

MAR 14 1944

To: WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON

Subject: Progress Report on SI Training for General
Donovan

The attached memorandum was prepared by Major
Cohen at the request of General Donovan. Would you
be good enough to see that it is transmitted to him.
I suggest that you may wish to have a copy made for
SI files:

WPM
W.P.M.

Enclosure

United States

SECRET

Equals Critical SECRET & SECRET

London Office 14,028
29 February, 1944
Progress Report
X 31
X Training

SUBJECT: Progress Report on SI Training
TO: General Donovan - through channels

1. Attached herewith is a copy of a report prepared on 31 December, 1943 concerning the training program at TS-7, the joint American-British school, conducted for part of the Sussex training. We are also including an additional progress report, as requested, bringing the report up to date.

LDC:CG

Copy to: SI Chief
DFI T.R.M.
File (2)

Louis D. Cohen
LOUIS D. COHEN
Major, AUS
Chief, SI Training

COPY

31 December 1943

SUBJECT: Progress report on training at TS-7 up to 1 January, 1944.
 TO: File

1. There are at present 6 separate groups of students organized as classes. The officer observers are lettered in classes A, B, C, and D containing respectively 6, 7, 5, and 6 students each. W/T operators are organized into two classes lettered K and L consisting of 4 and 4 students each. This gives a total of 32 students to which must be added 3 students who, while having participated in the training to this point, because of unfitness are in the process of rejection and disposition. Therefore, although there is a total of 35 students, only 32 can be considered as operative.

2. The course of training began on 15 November, 1943 with group A and additional groups have been added at two week intervals since that time. The schedule of training is: (1) conditioning course of 2 weeks, (2) parachute course of one week, (3) basic course of 6 weeks, (4) one week leave, and (5) a finishing course which includes briefing of an indefinite date, depending upon operations for its length and time of beginning.

3. The instructors are organized as a joint British and American training staff. The staff is lead by British and American senior instructors, Major Keyser and Lieutenant Macy respectively. The British staff consists of Captain Johnson, Captain Paton, Squadron Leader Ziegler, Captain Emery, Lieutenant Wingate, and Sergeant McBain. The American staff consists of Lieutenant Ryfield, Lieutenant Watson, Sergeant Robichaud, Sergeant Homola, and Sergeant Birdsall. In addition the British are supplying two administrative officers, namely Colonel Henderson as O.C. and Captain Thompson as Adjutant.

4. The course of training has been so devised as to have each of the instructors available to teach any of the subjects for which he might be qualified, that is, one man might teach two or three different subjects. Each of the instructors are designated as either No. 1, 2, or 3 in the order of their scheduling to take over any of the 12 different subjects taught at the school. The following is a list of the subjects taught.

Map Reading and Sketching

- (1) Lt. Ryfield
- (2) Lt. Wingate
- (3) Captain Paton

Weapon Training

- (1) Sergeants Robichaud and Homola
- (2) S/L Ziegler
- (3) Lieutenant Wingate

Classified Status

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Approved Status: MAY 1944

6. The American officers and EM at the school are proving to be well selected, and have been highly praised by the O.C. at the school. Some of the functions that they are carrying on in addition to those listed above are the servicing and maintaining of the school motor pool, equipping the code room and conducting code training for the students, developing and maintaining an order of battle room, and assisting in all the various instruction training projects so far as setting up of motion picture room, boxing room, and gymnasium is concerned, and providing an NCO artist to draw charts, sketches, and diagrams to illustrate the various lectures, etc.

7. A number of the staff officers of SI have been to TS-7 to visit, and other staff officers have remained for short periods as observer participants in the training program.

LDC:CG

LOUIS D. COHEN
Major, AUS
Chief, SI Training

United States
SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET & SECRET

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28 February, 1944

SUBJECT: Progress Report on Training at TS-7 (Area "A")

TO: File

1. The following is a distribution of students now in attendance at the school.

	<u>Observers</u>	<u>W/T Operators</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total Target (60 teams)	60	60	120
On School Roster	45	35	80
Absent (seriously injured)	1	-	1
Left on Mission	-	1	1
Rejected since last report	-	2	2
Total in Training	44	32	76
Balance Required	16	28	44

2. The courses have been conducted on the following scheme:

Conditioning Course	- 2 weeks
Parachute Course	- 1 week
Basic Course	- 6 weeks
Leave	- 1 week
Finishing course	- 2 weeks plus
Briefing	- 1 to 2 weeks

3. Instructors:

American

1st. Lt. Henry P. Watson
(Senior Instructor)
1st. Lt. Ernest L. Byfield
1st. Lt. Francis B. Thurber
1st. Lt. James T. St. Clair
2nd Lt. Louis G. Gebhard
2nd Lt. Robert P. Kennedy

1st. Lt. Henry R. Macy
(from 1 Feb. at Area B)

1st. Lt. Stephen P. Vinciguerra
T/S Louis E. Robichaud
T/S Aldrich P. Homola
Sgt. Ralph R. Birdsall

British

Sgt. McBain
Captain Johnson
Flight Lt. Mac Donald
Mr. Bird
Captain Paton
Lt. Wingate
Sqdn-Ldr. Ziegler

French

Colonel Pages
Captain Soucail
Captain Yvonne

United States

SECRET

4. Courses: The following is a list of the courses given with the names of the men actually teaching the courses listed by order of priority.

Map Reading and Sketching

- (1) Lt. Byfield
- (2) Lt. Wingate
- (3) Lt. St. Clair
- (4) Lt. Thurber

Weapons Training

- (1) Sergeant Robichaud
- (2) Sergeant Homola
- (3) Lt. Vinciguerra

Close Combat

- (1) Sergeant Robichaud
- (2) Sergeant Homola
- (3) Lt. Vinciguerra

Motor Cycling

- (1) Captain Johnson
- (2) Sergeant McBain

First Aid

- (1) Lt. Watson
- (2) Lt. St. Clair
- (3) Lt. Thurber

Obstacle Course

- (1) Sergeant Robichaud
- (2) Sergeant Homola
- (3) Lt. Vinciguerra

Military Identification

- (1) Captain Johnson
- (2) Lt. Watson
- (3) Lt. St. Clair
- (4) Captain Paton

Air Identification

- (1) Captain Paton
- (2) S/L Ziegler

Tracecraft - General

- (1) Lt. Watson
- (2) Colonel Pages
- (3) Captain Soucault

Tracecraft - Special

- (1) Captain Yvonnee

W/T

- (1) Lt. Gebhard
- (2) Sgt. Birdsall
- (3) Lt. Kennedy

Codes and Ciphers

- (1) P/Lt. Mac Donald
- (2) Mr. Bird

Ascension

- (1) S/L Ziegler
- (2) Lt. Thurber

5. Proportionate contribution of American Instructors:-
The sample period was selected from the 17 January, 1944 to 18 February, 1944 to determine the number of hours of teaching of each of the three participating nations in the Sussex program:

a.	<u>British</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>American</u>	
	68	22	144	
	54		138	
	44		125	
	30		86	
	44		64	
	32		54	
			53	
			40	
			<u>15</u>	
	<u>272</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>713</u>	<u>Total</u>
				1007 hours

b. It is immediately obvious from the above figures that the American instructional staff has borne approximately 71% of the teaching load at No. 2 E.T.S. - The British 27% - and the French 2% during the representative four-week period in question.

6. Additional contribution of American Staff:-

- All instructional films have been shown by the American Staff.
- All creative visual aid work at TS-7 was done by the American Sergeant secured for this type of work.
- All first aid and minor medical care was handled by Lt. Watson.

7. Additional contribution of British Staff:-

- All technical (radio) training has been done by the British at their Hans Place school in London. All other phases of W/T training have been largely taken care of by the American Staff.

- All parachute training has been done by the British through their channels.

8. The administrative work at TS-7 has been divided between the British and the Americans to this extent:-The American staff is conducting the motor pool, and the British staff is taking care of all maintenance, messing, and housing. At Prae Wood where the students were housed both a British and an American officer have managed the house. As of 28 February, 1944 an American PX was established at TS-7.

LDC:00

Louis D. Cohen
LOUIS D. COHEN
Major, AUS
Chief, SI Training

United States

SECRET

Equals British (MOST SECRET & SECRET)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 March 1944

London office 13874
X Scandinavian Branch
SECRET
X SOE

TO: Mr. Joseph M. Scribner
FROM: John M. Shaheen, Lt. Comdr., USNR
SUBJECT: Teletype Message for Scribner from Vetlesen

The following is a message for you from Comdr. Vetlesen in London. This was given to me today by Lt. Downey in London during a teletype conference:

"The following is for Scribner from Comdr. Vetlesen. It is personal and confidential.

"It has been found that SOE exercises full control over all operations, communications, transportation, and seems to have the right to decide and approve projects, all which are most jealously guarded as far as Denmark and Norway are concerned; this is not only within its own agency, but indirectly with others with whom they work.

"It is difficult to envisage what functions or policy the Scandinavian Branch, SO, London, shall pursue, especially after the integration between SO and SOE. It must be a matter of concern. Shall the Scandinavian Section, SO, London be so engulfed by the tactics and policies as practised by SOE that the OSS/SO original motives and purposes shall no longer survive or exist. Another of the many reasons advanced for difficulties as regards authority was that my rank was not high enough to deal with counterparts. My division is now last in line in regard to priorities. Due to these circumstances and many, many others, I regret that results as I would desire cannot be accomplished."

This should be done by me
Cable sent 6 Mar 44
to Moscow
SECRET
John M. Shaheen
Chief, Special Projects Office, OSS

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

London office 13,851

SECRET

Memo fm C.B. Compton, MO, London, re PWB
 Subject operations

Originator via SecretariatDate 3-6-44

Addressee _____

Date Rec'd _____

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
MO	Q			M.B.	Indicate action desired or taken
Scribner KHB EHB	2	3/9 11 MAR	11 MAR	KHB	
Gen. Magruder	Cent.	3/13	3/16	JM	
Ens. J. Wilson	South	3/16 MAR 16 1944	3/16	aqc	
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.				

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
U. S. ARMY

London Office 13, 857
x PWB
x OSS
x OWI
x Relations

24 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Political situation in PWB.
TO : Brigadier General W. J. Donovan, Director, O.S.S.,
Washington D. C.
FROM : C. B. Compton, M O Branch, O.S.S. London.

1. Just before you left here, you and I discussed on the telephone the political situation among the government agencies, British and American, participating in PWB operations. I detailed to you a number of the things that had happened, and you asked me to write a report.

2. Since your departure, there has been a great change for the better in the whole situation, and Rae Smith and I believe that this is largely due to your several interviews with General McClure, D. Jackson, and others. PWB is very busy now, working on operational and organizational plans, and there is little or no trace of the old tension which was so upsetting. Rather we find that everyone is leaning over backwards in an effort to channel the work properly, and make sure that no one is upset.

3. As a result, a lot of good work is being done rapidly, and we all hope that this era of cooperation will continue and enable O.S.S., and especially the M O Branch, to contribute properly to the coming operations.

C. B. COMPTON,
M O Branch, O.S.S.

ARMY AIR POUCH

Contents of letter - pouch no. H-118 dated 25 February 1944.
1 letter addressed Gen. Donovan, dated 24 February 1944 re PWB situation.

Jordan Office 13851
x P.W.B.
x O.S.S.
x O.W.I.
x Relations

To : Brigadier-General William J. Donovan

10 February, 1944

Before the meeting with Jackson this afternoon
I think you ought to see the attached memorandum from
Bates Compton.

RAF SMITH

RAF

United States

SECRETGROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MEMORANDUM

London office 13,851

X PWB
X OWI
X OSS
X PWE
X

9 February 1944.

SUBJECT : Liaison with SHAEF. 9-2-44.

TO : Rae Smith.

FROM : Bates Compton.

1. "Politics" are creating a serious diversion from the war effort in the PWB setup. There is no question but what both OWI and PWE are actively and passively resisting the participation of OSS in PWB activities, and doing everything to minimize our importance in the picture when we have to be recognized. The latest example of this is in the assignment of offices to the deputies from the agencies with PWB-SHAFF. This was done under the direction of Mr. Jackson, of OWI, who himself occupies 2 rooms with his secretary, next to which is a large, well lighted office assigned to the PWE representative. Across the hall is an inside cubbyhole assigned to OSS. Actually, the OSS office is adequate. Mention of this question would be petty grumbling if it were not such an obvious example of the continuous effort to low-rate this organization.
2. "Politics" again; Yesterday Mr. Jackson talked to me after his conversation with General Donovan, and assured me that he would do everything in his power to eliminate politics from the situation and get on with the war effort. In the same breath he threatened, if General Donovan pressed him too far, to start a fight in Washington to remove authority from OSS for Black propaganda operations, and to obtain authority for OWI to operate agents behind enemy lines. I told him that initiating any such Pennsylvania Avenue campaign would clearly be destructive to the war effort, and I urged him to reverse his strategy and do everything in his power to make OSS feel that it was getting an even break in PWB. He assured me that he would. I reported this conversation to Colonel Blakeney, so that he may compose these differences as far as he can.
3. More "Politics". Rumors of dissention in OWI, and of OWI pressure having caused several shifts of the officer personnel of PWB are demoralizing or disturbing the officers now on the job, including General McClure.
4. In the situation reflected above, I think all of us here need to keep clear heads and adhere to our original policy of non-participation in political pulling and hauling and full cooperation in carrying out the PWB job.

United States

SECRET

BATES COMPTON

13,708

Note:

General Donovan said that he would prefer that something be done in the field instead of his sending such a letter. Talked about it with Maddox and he felt it would be more advisable not to do anything about it now in the field and that he would make an effort to meet Parrott and make his acquaintance and have an opinion about him. I myself will try to get something done in the field when I arrive if Maddox wishes.

W. H. S.

15 August 1944.

file

DH

TO: Mr. Chastin Date: _____

I went over this draft
with MR Shephardson
who approved it.

I believe it should
be retyped before it
goes to the General

W. Leary

Office of the Secretariat

(8230)

SECRET*London Office 13, 708*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

x clearance
x Parrott Major

20 July 1944

Major General Clayton Bissell
War Department, General Staff
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Bissell:

Late last February, I wrote you concerning the possible release of Major Thomas A. Parrott who was then Executive Officer in JICA North Africa. At that time you did not consider his release advisable.

Though I recognize fully the problem created by releasing valued personnel, I trust you will not mind my reopening the subject with reference to a specific assignment in the Mediterranean Theater which Major Parrott would be eminently qualified to fill, as Executive Officer to the Chief of Secret Intelligence.

The Chief, SI in the Mediterranean Theater will be responsible for secret intelligence operations in the whole area, covering the various OSS bases at Istanbul, Cairo, Algiers, Bari, Caserta and Corsica. As Executive Officer, Major Parrott would deal directly with the SI chiefs at these bases and act for the Chief in his absence. The position is particularly important in developing not only future SI operations in the Mediterranean but also the intelligence penetration of Germany, Austria, and the Balkans. For such a post I feel Major Parrott is peculiarly adapted by reason of his experience in his present assignment.

Conditions may have so changed since February that Major Parrott's availability has increased during the intervening months. Under any circumstances, if the responsibility which we propose for Major Parrott seems in your opinion to warrant his release to the Office of Strategic Services, I would greatly appreciate your reconsidering the question in the light of this specific assignment which we have for him.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

London Office 13, 708

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

x Parrot, May
x Success

11 July 1944

TO: Mr. Charles Cheston
FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson
SUBJECT: Major Thomas A. Parrot

It is desired to obtain the transfer of Major Parrot from JICA/North Africa to OSS, Algiers for assignment as Executive Officer to the Chief, SI in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

The Chief, SI MEDTO has responsibility for Secret Intelligence operations from OSS Headquarters for the Mediterranean Theater and from the various OSS bases in the Mediterranean Theater at Cairo, Istanbul, Bari, Caserta, Corsica and such other points as are already, or will be, established.

As Executive Officer to the Chief, SI MEDTO, Major Parrot would be responsible for assisting in the development of SI operational policy and for the coordination of SI operations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Major Parrot would act for the Chief, SI MEDTO during any absence from OSS Headquarters and would represent the Chief, SI MEDTO in direct dealings with the SI Chiefs at the respective bases in the Mediterranean area.

In view of the present importance of OSS operations in the Mediterranean Theater and the importance of the Mediterranean bases in developing future SI activities throughout the entire area, including the intelligence penetration of Germany and other enemy occupied territories, the assignment in view for Major Parrot is of obvious and outstanding importance. Major Parrot is peculiarly qualified to fill the proposed assignment by reason of his experience in his present assignment. In addition, Major Parrot possesses to a marked degree the qualities to be desired in an officer holding such a post of duty.

Approximately three weeks ago, in ETO, General Betts, G-2, requested the transfer to his Staff of Lt. Col. F. P. Miller, Chief Division Field Intelligence, OSS. In spite of Lt. Col. Miller's experience with and valuable services to OSS, this request for transfer was granted, as being to the greater over-all advantage to the Allied military effort exerted out of the U.K. Correspondingly, it is hoped that, unless the strongest of reasons make Major Parrot unavailable, his transfer to OSS, MEDTO be permitted, in view of the critical need for an officer of his experience and capabilities.

SECRET

WHS
W. H. S.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

London Office 13, 108
x/yubney
x Pomo-F, May

27 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN:

Subject: Transfer to OSS of Major Thomas
A. Parrot.

1. I concur wholeheartedly in the statement contained in your 25 February memorandum that new tasks face all of us in the Mediterranean Theater and ETO. It is primarily because of the increased demands in all areas for Military Intelligence personnel that it is impossible for G-2 to comply with your request for Major Parrot's release.
2. Major Parrot is able and thoroughly trained in MID work and requirements. He is at present the Executive Officer in JICA/North Africa. As you may know, Colonel Sharp, Chief of JICA, was recently relieved to assume Military Attache duties in Spain. Major reorganization of JICA/North Africa and Middle East has been preposed.
3. Under the circumstances, it is inadvisable to release Major Parrot.

Clayton Bissell
CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DM LEB 53 6M + 53



at request of Ensign Putzell - a
copy was sent to Mr. Shepardson
on 29 Feb 1944

SECRET

035

035 Form 4191

Date 25 Feb. 1961

To: General Magruder

General Donovan asks that
you be good enough to deliver
the attached to General
Bissell at your early con-
venience.

E.J. Putzell, Jr.

SECRET

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

OAS FORM 1001a

SECRETDate 21 Feb. 1944To: General Donovan

Attached for your signature is a proposed memorandum for General Bissell concerning the transfer of Major Parrot.

In accordance with your request contained in cable 20164 from Algiers dated 29 January 1944, which is attached hereto, your message to General Bissell has been held pending your return to Washington.

A. W. Sullivan
A. W. Sullivan

Attachments

San Magister
Office of the Secretary

SECRET

(9139)

033

London Office 18.70.5
 X Security **SECRET**
 X Parrot, May.

21 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL CLAYTON BISSSELL

Subject: Transfer to OSS of Major Thomas A. Parrot

1. I have been advised that Major Parrot's transfer from his present duty with JICA in Algiers to London, OSS has already been requested. After a lengthy stay in the Mediterranean Area and conferences with General Wilson and others on several occasions, it is quite apparent to me that new tasks face all of us, both in the Mediterranean Theater and in FTO. I feel confident that if Colonel Adams who rejected our original request realized this, he would agree to Major Parrot's release.

2. Colonel Edward Glavin, Strategic Services Officer at Algiers, has discussed this subject with Colonel Witsner, who stated that if the War Department G-2 endorsed the request for transfer, he will offer no objections.

3. Major Parrot's qualifications have been reviewed here in Washington and we would be most appreciative if you could make him available for transfer so that he could be ordered from Algiers to report to Colonel David Bruce's assistant, Lt. Col. Francis P. Miller, at OSS, London.

William J. Donovan
 Director

*Cable ref -
 for 24 days - Algiers - 1/29/44
 #20164*

SECRET

SECRET

Date: Feb. 21, 1944

To: General Wm. J. Donovan

Attached cable No. 20164
Memo from Mr. Shepardson

I have just talked with Whitney Shepardson who says that he believes nothing has been done since you talked with Major Parrot in Algiers.

Whitney thinks that if General Bissell knew of the very important work contemplated as Executive Officer for SUSSEX in London and our opinion that Parrot is particularly qualified for the task a release could be secured.

Whitney thought you might wish to address a letter to General Bissell stating your hope that our request could be granted for the above reasons.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

SECRET

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

(12678)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Col. G. Edward Buxton

FROM: Whitney H. Shepardson

SUBJECT: Transfer of Major Parrott (W.J.D.'s cable #20164 from Algiers 29 January 1944.)


DATE: 3 February 1944

As I read this cable, the Director sends a message for General Bissell, but does not want it delivered until he (the Director) reaches Washington.

We have gone "all out" for this officer, Major Parrott. Half a dozen of us think that he is exactly fitted to be Miller's executive in London re important future operations.

Will you help me to bring this to the Chief's attention when he returns, so that we can act with the greatest possible speed?

W.H.S.



SECRET

OSS
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE January 29, 1944

FROM

EXDET, ALGIERS

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN-1071

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

CONNELLY, NATO, ETO, SI,
SCRIDMER, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37883-1

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

#20164. To Buxton from Gen. Donovan.

The message which follows should be given to Colonel Bissell of the War Department G-2: "I have been advised that Major Parrott's transfer from his present duty with JICA in Algiers to London OSS has already been requested. After lengthy stay in the Mediterranean area and conferences with General Wilson and others on several occasions, it is quite apparent that new tasks face all of us, both here and in ETO. I feel confident that if Colonel Adams, who rejected our original request, realized this, he would agree to Major Parrott's release. Glavin has talked with Colonel Witzer* here on this subject. The latter stated that if the War Department G-2 endorses the request for transfer he will offer no objections. Washington has reviewed Major Parrott's qualifications for this position and we would be most appreciative if you could make him available for transfer so that he could be ordered from Algiers to report to Colonel Bruce's assistant at OSS London, Lt. Col. Miller." To Buxton: The message above should be delivered when I return to Washington.

SECRET

*Received KWITZER.

TOR: 1/29/44 7:54 P.M.

FILE COPYIT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR RETROGRADE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

SECRET
Originator via SecretariatDate 2/24/64


Addressee

Date Rec'd

Subject Mem to Gen. Donovan from J.S.
Dorfman re plans of Labor Desk (London)

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		Indicate action desired or taken
Planning Group	Cent.	2/25 3/9	3/9	JPM	
Gen. Magruder	Cent.	3/3	3/6	JPM	
Mr. Shepardson		MAR 9 1964	MAR 16 1964	SWW	
E.J. Putzell	Adm.			P	
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.				

Sent to Mr. San



Noted: DB

London Office 13668
 + Labor Division
 + Germany
 + Australian
 February 4, 1944.
 + Dorfman, J. S.

To: Brig. General William J. Donovan,
 Director, OSS.

From: I. S. Dorfman.

Upon your request, I here set forth the plans of the Labor Desk (London), which are part of a larger undertaking directed by Major Goldberg, to penetrate Germany. Certain of these have already been acted upon, while others are still in the blueprint stage. In the nature of things, the plans are tentative and subject to modification.

OBJECTIVES:

We hope, by working with and developing militant trade union groups resisting Nazism, to: (i) obtain intelligence from Germany; and (ii) cause the commission of sabotage, disruption of communications and facilities such as will aid the Allied armies and hinder the defence of Germany².

RECRUITING:

A program for recruiting agents is in progress in the United States and here. Nine or ten recruits, now in training in the United States, and constituting the first of probably four such units destined for this theatre of operations, are awaiting transportation to London. One civilian recruit is available here, subject to security check, and several more having a trade union background, are under consideration. Also, application has been made for the transfer to us of an enlisted man now stationed in Great Britain. With the permission of the U.S. armed forces, we intend to interview and recruit, if possible, other enlisted men and officers as agents.

Further recruiting will be done by Labor Desk personnel on the continent when an Allied bridgehead is established. The invasion will undoubtedly encourage militant trade unionists to filter through the lines to Allied bases, from which points they can be returned to Germany as agents, after a period of instruction. Trade union representatives who have experienced underground work in Germany and who have been collaborating with us will be of considerable help in evaluating the reliability and possible usefulness of

² This objective is to be pursued in conjunction with S.O.

Planning Group
 Reginald C. P. [unclear] ETO

-ii-

London file B663
 x J. J. J. J.
 x Germany
 x Reinhold

prospective recruits.

TRAINING:

Training of the agents will vary, of course, with the individual and with the specific projects assigned. In general, however, the course for those recruited before a bridgehead is established will include para-military training; a basic SI-SO course; parachute jumping; communications, and, for some, W/T training; information about living conditions in present-day Germany, especially in the areas of operation; underground operational methods and practices; organization of resistance units and of strikes; and sabotage techniques.

Instructors are available in London who themselves at one time have participated in underground work in Germany. Agents recruited on the continent from among trade union resistance groups will, of course, know well the areas of operation, the living conditions, and the practices and procedures of underground work. Their instruction will therefore be of a more summary nature; mainly briefing, the essentials of communications, military reporting and means of entering Germany.

MEANS OF ENTERING GERMANY:

A number of devices for entering Germany, based on information now at hand, are under consideration, including those here set forth in barest outline. Of course, each presents problems in cover, necessary papers, dispatch or transportation, etc. I believe, however, that these may not be insurmountable. It is possible too that upon invasion of western Europe, Germany will tighten up on border and ports of entry controls, or forbid entirely the entry of foreigners into Germany, in which event certain of the plans which follow may have to be modified or dropped.

(a) As a French worker:

Due to its shortage of labor, Germany welcomes French workers who volunteer for work in Germany. So great is the demand for workers that the German authorities often comply with requests to be employed in specific areas. Agents who are qualified to use this cover thus may enter Germany from France expeditiously and by the normal means of transportation.

(b) As a worker on leave in France returning to Germany:

Many foreign workers in Germany and some German workers travel to France for their vacations. A qualified agent in France, with false papers or with the papers of one of these workmen on leave (slightly modified if necessary) may enter Germany by normal means of transportation.

-iii-

(6) As a worker from a neutral country:

German authorities look with great favor upon workers of neutral countries who volunteer to work in Germany. Prospective agents for this purpose may be found in Sweden and Switzerland, e.g., but if not, agents may get into those countries and be dispatched from there as workers to Germany. Sweden may, of course, be entered by normal channels, given appropriate cover. Switzerland may be entered legally or illegally via France. In a neutral country it may be possible to induce a person of suitable qualifications to apply for a passport to Germany and then to substitute the likeness of the agent for that of the applicant on the passport.

(d) As a sailor or stowaway on a Swedish ship entering a German port.

I am advised that at Stettin, e.g. (which has become a very important port since the bombing of Hamburg), when a Swedish ship docks there is a cursory examination of the crew by the local Gestapo agent, after which the captain of the ship may issue shore passes to members of the crew with the pro forma approval of the superintendent of the port. With the assistance of the I.T.F. it may be possible, by means of the shore pass, to enter Germany. The stowaway could leave the harbor area with the pass and then send it back to the sailor who received it by means of another sailor, or in some other way. In the alternative, the sailor could leave the harbor area and give the pass to a suitable person who wished to escape from Germany. There is no photograph of the bearer on the pass, although the bearer must, of course, if requested, be ready to produce his identification papers.

(e) As a German officer:

Taking advantage of the widespread unquestioning and submissive attitude in Germany towards German officers, agents may be dressed in the uniforms of German officers killed in action, carry their papers as well, and thus gain access into Germany. When it has served its purposes, the uniform may be discarded for civilian clothes.

(f) As a Luxembourger:

Provided the consent of the British authorities is obtained, the Luxembourg Ministers of Labor and Justice (Intelligence) are prepared to recruit Luxembourgers for use as agents, to be parachuted into Luxembourg or nearby Belgium. I am advised that their underground network is sufficiently developed to permit of a "reception committee" to receive such agents.

Germany considers Luxembourgers as belonging to the German culture, and hence permits comparatively free movement between the two countries.

-iv-

(g) Other means of dispatch:

Depending on all the circumstances and the facilities available, agents from a base in France may be infiltrated through the German line or placed behind them by air or sea facilities. For maximum chances of success, agents parachuted into Germany should have a "reception committee" to receive them. This is possible only when communications are established between ourselves and resistance groups in Germany. Until such time it would be best to parachute agents adjacent to a city receiving a major Allied air raid, preferably while the raid is in progress. A city in a disorganized condition permits a maximum of flexibility in the use of cover. It is even possible to take clothes and papers from a person killed in the raid and move on to another city with the story of having been bombed out. If necessary, one can claim to have lost his papers in the raid, and obtain a complete set of genuine papers in another city.

PAPERS:

Necessary German papers vary, of course, with the cover employed. The following, among others, will be especially helpful: (a) Arbeitsbuch (work book), (b) ration book, (c) special traveller's food stamps, (d) clothing book, (e) pass to place of employment, (f) leave authorization, (g) travel orders signed by an army district commander, (h) Wehrmacht identification, and (i) Wehrmacht ration book.

We are attempting to obtain originals of these and other documents to facilitate their reproduction for use by our agents.

COMMUNICATIONS:

Until the first few of our agents have made the necessary contacts in Germany to enlist trade union organizational support, communications will probably be in the nature of courier service making contact with Labor Desk personnel near the battle lines or with persons collaborating with us in neutral countries. When appropriate preparations have been made concerning security, radio operators could be parachuted into Germany with equipment, if necessary, and the messages of the agents could then be transmitted by radio to designated receiving centers.

A list of friendly addresses in Germany is being compiled for use by our agents. Although it is recognized that conditions arising out of the war may render certain of the addresses valueless, others of them may be of vital assistance.

ACTIVITIES INSIDE GERMANY:

The degree of freedom an agent may have in moving about Germany depends in part upon his cover. We know, however, that travel on local trains for distances less than 30 kilometers is relatively free of

-v-

official supervision. An agent could then travel for considerable distances, but only about 30 kilometers on any one ticket. The success of an agent in the fulfillment of his mission will depend in great measure upon the extent to which he is able to enlist the support of the trade union resistance groups.

I should be glad, upon request, to add such details to this outline as are within my knowledge.



I. S. Dorfman.

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

SECRETSubject: Dissemination of OSS Intelligence
in ETOOriginator via SecretariatDate 2/24/44

Addressee

Date Rec'd

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
Mr. Shepardson <i>Scarp</i>	9	<i>FEB 25 1944</i>	<i>FEB 25 1944</i>	<i>YMD</i>	
<i>Babin</i> Gen. Magruder	1108 Cent.	<i>2/28</i>	<i>2/28</i>	<i>761</i>	
		<i>2/29</i>	<i>3/2</i>	<i>Jm.</i>	
ETO	South				
Dr. Langer	Annex			<i>JRL</i>	
E.J. Putzell	Adm.			<i>P</i>	
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.				



London office 13,674
 United States x Dissemination
CONFIDENTIAL
 Equate British CONFIDENTIAL


To: Col.D. K. E. Bruce
From: Philip Horton
Subject: Dissemination Of OSS Intelligence In This Theatre

It is practically impossible to give an adequate and comprehensive picture, whether graphic or written, of the overall dissemination and circulation of OSS intelligence in this theatre. The latest charts available in this office which show the collection and dissemination of intelligence in this theatre by American agencies have long since been outdated. The chart attached herewith, the result of a hasty two hours work this morning, attempts only to show the manner in which our dissemination at the moment fits into the emergent pattern of intelligence servicing the Supreme Allied Command. This pattern is necessarily entirely tentative in so far as it attempts to show the channeling of intelligence to the Supreme Allied Command. In other respects it shows the dissemination which is currently being made of OSS intelligence by the SI Reports Division.

It should be noted in particular that in the absence of any new directive, we continue to disseminate to G-2 Etoussa although it is our understanding that this agency is functioning only with a skeletal staff and will soon be eliminated as an intermediary. In this event, it may well be that we shall be asked to disseminate directly to TIS (Theatre Intelligence Service). It should be noted further that the chart does not undertake to show internal OSS dissemination or dissemination to other OSS Missions.

The chart does not attempt to show the further dissemination of OSS intelligence which may be made by the original receiving agency. We have, however, indicated to the American agencies to which we service (G-2, ONI, etc.) that we disseminate directly to the British, so that, theoretically at least, OSS intelligence should be reaching British agencies only through our dissemination to MI6, PWE and SOE.

*Shepherdson, May 1945
 D. L. 94 6*



*Master
Name*

INFORMATION


ROUTING SHEET

SECRET

Originator via Secretariat
 Date 2/26/46
 Addressee _____
 Date Rec'd _____

Subject 5th Air Force Request for
Further OSS Personnel

To	Room No.	Date		Comments
		Rec'd	Indicate action desired or taken	
Dr. Langer	Annex			
Gen. Magruder	Cent.	2/29		
ETO	South			
E.J. Putzell	Adm.			
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.			



gdw
p



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION~~

LONDON, ENGLAND

Equals British MOST SECRET

SECRET

9 February 1944

Subject: 8th Air Force Request for Further OSS Personnel

To : Brigadier General William J. Donovan

1. At the beginning of December Lt. Colonel L. P. Weicker approached Colonel Bruce or Colonel Giblin and was directed through channels to Crane Brinton and me in an effort to obtain 4 or 5 young intelligent economists or statisticians to aid the 8th Air Force in its Order of Battle work. As explained at the time the 8th Air Force relied exclusively on British intelligence for Order of Battle material and needed competent staff to shape this material to 8th Air Force requirements. In particular I was given to understand the 8th Air Force wanted an appreciation not only of the overall capabilities of GAF single-engine fighters, but a fusion of material on order of battle, personalities in squadrons, experience and training of squadrons, and the economic concepts by which scale of effort may be related to wastage and replacements, so to obtain the exact statement of enemy capabilities by squadrons over various periods of time. In addition a large body of material represented by combat crew reports which was not used in this connection would be given to the OSS group for processing. It was explained that the end product would be used in the formation of tactical plans.

2. Shortly thereafter Sgt. W. C. Baum arrived in this country and has been put to work in a section of Air Ministry intelligence where he has learned British techniques and added to the general resources, both British and American, engaged in the preparation of the material previously received. A qualified enlisted man, Pvt. R. G. Espie, has since that time been acquired in this Theatre, but his assignment to the Air Ministry has been held up pending clarification of the 8th Air Force-Air Ministry arrangement. Two more OSS men, one officer and one enlisted man, are due to arrive tomorrow.

3. Over the last three weeks I have been in touch with Colonel Kingman Douglas, 8th Air Force liaison officer with the Air Ministry, and Lt. Col. L. P. Weicker, Ex. Officer, Office of Director of Intelligence, USSAFE, to ascertain what progress had been made by the 8th Air Force and the Air Ministry in the formulation of their working program. It is understood that space at the Air Ministry

United States

SECRET

Equivalent British MOST SECRET & SECRET

is at a premium since the ODI, USSAFE has assigned a number of officers to the Air Ministry following my first conversations with Colonel Woelker. The situation is further complicated by the recent arrival in the Theatro of Lt. Colonel Humphreys who is interested in planning bomber tactics in collaboration with Operational Research Sections.

4. Now work opened up for the EOU and the failure of previously assigned personnel for our Damage Assessment Unit at P. R. has inclined me, in the face of the 8th Air Force's inability to decide on a program, to withdraw our offer of personnel. OSS was not informed when ODI, USSAFE decided to install its officers in the Air Ministry and has not been apprised of the development of plans.
5. I should very much like the benefit of your judgment on this matter.

C. P. Kindleberger, Capt. AUS (R&A)
 Enemy Objectives Unit
 Economic Warfare Div.

United States

SECRET

Equivalent British MOST SECRET & SECRET

London office 13.6.66

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

SECRETOriginator Via SecretariatDate 2/26/66

Addressee _____

Date Rec'd _____

Subject Organization Description of SI
Training Section (London)

TO	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		Indicate action desired or taken
Mr. Shepardson	Q	FEB 25 1966		MM	Kaife: Take copy serials ✓ Pass on MM
ETO	South			JBW	
E.J. Putzell	Adm.			EBP	
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.				

Sandau office 13,666
 2 February, 1944
 ETD

SUBJECT: Organization Description of SI Training Section

TO: Lieutenant Colonel Francis P. Miller

1. The following is a description of the organization of the SI Training Section:

LONDON OFFICE

Major Louis D. Cohen

- Chief SI Training, Supervises and Directs all Training Programs for SI, Liaison, etc.

1st. Lt. Martin E. Nedell

- Ass't. Chief of Training, Supervises Supply, Administration, Personnel for all SI Training Establishments, Manages London Office.

Sgt. Mitchell S. Klubowicz

- Chief Clerk.

Pfc. Orpha J. Gresham

- Secretary to Major Cohen, Lt. Nedell, Filing Typing.

AREA "A"

1st. Lt. Henry P. Watson

- Senior Instructor and U.S. Administrative Officer.

1st. Lt. Ernest L. Byfield

- Instructor

1st. Lt. Stephen Vinciguerra

- Instructor

2nd. Lt. James T. St. Clair

- Instructor

2nd. Lt. Louis G. Gebhard

- Instructor

T/3 Louis E. Robichaud

- Instructor - Acting First Sergeant

S/Sgt. Eugene (NMI) Milbauer

- Instructor - Artist

T/3 Aldrich F. Homola

- Instructor

Sgt. Ralph R. Birdsall

- Instructor

Sgt. Francis A. DeVautour

- Dispatcher - Chief of Motor Pool

Cpl. Frederick C. Mousseau

- Instructor - First Aid

T/5 William D. Lynch

- Driver

Pfc. Stanley J. Kulik

- Driver

Pvt. Ralph F. Bohner

- Driver

Pvt. Scott L. Crull

- Driver

Pvt. Richard P. Linder

- Driver

AREA "B"

1st. Lt. Franklin G. Allen

- Commanding Officer

1st. Lt. Henry R. Macy

- Senior Instructor

T/Sgt. John A. Petersen

- Instructor - First Sergeant

S/Sgt. Cornelius (NMI) Poillon

- Chief of Motor Pool, Mechanic

T/3 Robert L. Melberg

- Instructor

T/3 Seyer B. Aminrud

- Instructor

T/3 Randall A. Bowman

- Instructor

b	T/3 Robert A. Smith	- Instructor - First Aid
b	Opl. Allen E. Reynolds	- PX Steward
b	T/3 Keith G. Denton	- Mess Sergeant
b	T/5 Alfred L. Harner	- Dispatcher, Driver
b	Pfc. Joe (NMI) Garza	- Table Waiter and K.P.
b	Pfc. Francis J. Kohler	- Cook and K.P.
b	Pfc. Robert C. O'Malley	- Company Clerk
b	Pvt. James F. Brandis	- Cook and K.P.
b	Pvt. Marion F. Staszewski	- Cook and K.P.
b	Pvt. Edwin (NMI) Tomlinack	- Orderly
b	Pvt. George E. Warren	- Driver
b	Pvt. Harry (NMI) Weiss	- Cook and K.P.

LDC:00

cc: Major Maddox

Louis D. Cohen
 LOUIS D. COHEN
 Major, AUS
 Chief, SI Training

Note: a - Men attached to SI Training from Communications Branch
 b - Men attached to SI Training from Services Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

Date: April 11
1944

To: Special Funds

I assume that Major Alcorn will
be bonded if such action is
necessary or appropriate.

G. Edward Buxton

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

126781

London Office - 13.6.60
X A. F. Allen

April 11, 1944

Mr. G. F. Allen
 Chief Disbursing Officer
 Division of Disbursement
 Treasury Department
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Allen:

It is understood that the Division of Disbursement has opened an office in London, England, where disbursements are being made by an Assistant Disbursing Officer in the name of G. F. Allen, Chief Disbursing Officer.

The Office of Strategic Services will have occasion to make payments for objects of a confidential nature which are covered by vouchers certified to by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services. In order to facilitate the operations of this service in that area, it is proposed to make specific allotments of these funds to Major Robert M. Alcorn, a financial representative of the Director in that area, and it is requested that your assistant be instructed to accept vouchers chargeable to those funds when approved by Major Robert M. Alcorn, in amounts not to exceed amounts allocated by this office for this purpose, and it is understood and agreed that upon presentation of these vouchers to this office they will be certified by the Director in the usual manner, thus completing the vouchers so that they may be taken into your accounts as credits for expenditures.

Most sincerely,

G. Edward Newton

Assistant Director

JWWilliams:MRW

London office 13/652

SECRET

ROUTING SHEET

INFORMATION

Originator via Secretariat
 Date 2/24/44
 Addressee _____
 Date Rec'd _____

Subject Priority Work List R&A London
of February 5, 1944

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments Indicate action desired or taken
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
Planning Group	Cent.	2/25	3/11		
Gen. Magruder	Cent.	3/11	3/14	JM	
E.J. Putzell	Adm.			P	
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.				



13652
 London Office
 vR vQ
 x Priority, LCV

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
 United States Government,
 Research and Analysis Branch,
 London, England.

February 5, 1944.

SUBJECT: Priority Work List R. & A. London.
 TO : General Donovan

Our work can be divided into I. Regular weekly assignments, and II. Specific, sometimes continuing, assignments not requiring regular periodic reports. These will have to be treated separately.

I. REGULAR WEEKLY ASSIGNMENTS

1. Briefing the R. & A. representative at the Weekly Meeting of the American Intelligence Committee. This is a mixed committee headed by Bucknell of the Embassy with the representatives of G-2, A-2, Navy, OSS, and OWI. The AIC has not yet fulfilled Shep. Morgan's hope that it would produce reports of its own, but I do not think we ought to drop it as it always contains the promise of producing something and it is, at any rate, a kind of a rough equivalent of a JIC of American Intelligence Groups in London. I give this first priority on our regular weekly assignments.

2. A weekly report to Mr. Winant. This is mostly an assembling job, putting together materials already worked up especially by R. & A. Washington. It takes little time and should, I think, be kept up.

3. The Political Annex to the G-2 Weekly Intelligence Report. I believe Langer does not think this job very important. Our R. & A. staff in London is, however, of contrary opinion. This report is circulated down through Divisional Staffs in the theatre and also goes to air fields and to various staffs in London. We have evidence that our political stuff is really read and appreciated. Colonel Bruce will back me up in my statement that this job has, on the whole, added to our prestige here. I should be most reluctant to abandon this weekly report though it does mean a full day's work once a week for some half dozen of the staff. In summary I should be reluctant to give up any of these three weekly jobs though in a pinch I suppose we could give up the G-2 report.

2.

II. CONTINUING BUT NON-PERIODIC TASKS

1. Joint political intelligence appreciation work ~~PWE~~-OSS.
~~This~~ work will begin with D-day but some preliminary organization will have to be done. It involves our helping to staff a joint ~~PWE~~-OSS roster which in turn can draw on the joint resources of the two agencies. This plan you and Colonel Bruce approved last night (4 February). I think this work as it develops will probably be our first priority.
2. The target work of the Economic Objectives Unit (EOU) at 40 Berkeley Square. You are, of course, familiar with this work. It is clearly a high priority job.
3. There are a whole series of servicing jobs which we do for various agencies in the theatre. I list them here in no absolute priority. Inevitably each specific task varies in importance and it is very difficult to decide ahead of time which kind of job we should accept and which turn down.
 - a. ☒ Servicing the work of Lt. Col. Jackson's Strategic Information Branch. Jackson's Group has prepared a series of important reports which went directly to General Devers and which, I understand, are now to go to General Eisenhower. Notably, Jackson's Group prepared a report on our whole air policy to which Pinkney and some of the staff at 40 Berkeley contributed. Jackson's Group also did a master report on German morale in which OSS had the place of honour. It is now at work answering three specific questions put to it by General Eisenhower. One of these, which deals with French railways, should give Pinkney a most appropriate job for several weeks. On the whole I think Jackson's Committee one of the most important for whom we work in the theatre.
 - b. ☒ Servicing the first U.S. Army Group and other U.S. Staff Groups. We did a big job, mostly assembling, for these people last December. Probably the peak of their demands on us have already been reached and passed. In the future I think our joint ~~PWE~~-OSS service can take care of this demand.
 - c. Servicing other branches of OSS London. We have done a great variety of jobs for SI, MO, and to a lesser extent for SO and X-2. Notably we have supplied material and some man-power (or woman-power) for a joint American and British group assembling materials necessary for counter intelligence work in the field. Naturally X-2 carries most of this burden, but we are supplying a certain amount of background material. Obviously we should do all we can to help the other branches of OSS in this theatre.

3.

4. The work of the GIU (General Intelligence Unit) on economic matters centering at Berkeley Square though done partly at Princes Risborough. OSS shares this work jointly with other constituents of EWD. It is, as you can see from the title, 'General Intelligence Unit', one of the most dispersed of our tasks and one which I simply have not been able to follow in detail. If when Malenbaum arrives from Washington we can build up an all-R. & A. economic staff, it is possible we could pull out of the GIU. I should be willing to accept Kindleberger's judgment on this problem. Clearly, however, our GIU work is of lower priority than our EOU work for economists.

5. Civil Affairs Work. All told we have done a good deal of this—mostly assembling detailed information of the most varying nature. I suspect that these demands have already reached their peak. I think more over that R. & A.'s contribution to Civil Affairs can in the future be best handled by our joint FWE-OSS outfit. As I understand General McClure's plans, CA officers in the field will draw their political and economic intelligence largely from FWE sources of which our joint FWE-OSS Group will form an important part. Meanwhile we are committed through Walter Dorn to do a certain amount of work for Civil Affairs at their big final school at Shrivenham in Wiltshire. We have already promised to do this work and cannot in decency withdraw. Furthermore, this work should all be finished by mid-March. I think we should be free in the future to avoid any big commitments to Civil Affairs.

6. Our general task as a collecting and distributing agency for R. & A. Washington. I do not imply by numbering this six that our activities in this field are of low priority. They are, however, of long standing and though R. & A. Washington no doubt feels we do not do a perfect job, I can assure you we are doing our best and that we shall continue to do our best. Since Applebaum's appointment in Washington I have a feeling that the whole business of the two way flow between Washington R. & A. and London R. & A. is being much better handled. We could, of course, do a better job getting raw materials from here to Washington if we had enough Secretaries and enough typewriters. I have put Joseph Charles in general charge of seeing that Washington requests are fulfilled. If Miss Violet Bodman is sent us she can, no doubt, take over the administration side of this.

7. There are left over two very special assignments which lie a bit outside our regular work and which I shall have to treat under the names of the individuals assigned to them.

a. Paul Sweezy. Sweezy is really Ed. Mason's personal agent in London to take care of work for the Cartel Committee headed by Dean Acheson of the State Department with Ed. Mason as Deputy Chairman. Some of Sweezy's spare time we use for occasional odd economic jobs closely tied in with our work at Brook Street. Sweezy's position is so closely tied in with Ed. Mason's plans that I should hope to see any other use made of Sweezy's time without Mason's specific consent.

b. Joseph Charles. As you know, Charles came to us as Con. Read's agent to report on political and other conditions in the British Isles. We soon ran into certain difficulties with the State Department over Charles doing political reporting in an Allied country, and last October decided that the difficulties were so great that we had better use Charles for other purposes. Recently Langer has renewed his demand that Charles return to political reporting on Great Britain for which he is, I admit, admirably suited. Colonel Bruce, however, regards the obstacles to Charles' doing this work as in no sense removed and is of the opinion that the Embassy would object if Charles did just what Langer wants him to do. I still hope we can achieve some kind of compromise in this matter which I think must be left to time and to negotiations between Bruce and myself and Howard Bucknell of the Embassy. In any case I, personally think that this political reporting on Britain should be given a relatively low priority.

III. SUMMARY

The above can give only a rough idea of the extremely varied odd jobs we have done in the past. In general I should recommend that we should not break very violently with our general policy in the past but should modify it slowly as follows:-

- i. Pull gradually out of Civil Affairs work except such as can be done by our joint FWE-OSS teams.
- ✓ ii. Turn down as far as possible the more piddling requests for the kind of work any good librarian or secretary can do, i.e. assembling routine information from hand-books etc.
- iii. Endeavour generally to give highest priority to tasks which will employ our best capabilities, i.e. tasks involving careful diagnosis of actual current political and economic conditions in Central and Western Europe. I think if this diagnosing job is done well those for whom we do the job will see better their way to taking curative or preventive measures. I think, however, we should be very careful even when dealing with pretty big general matters always to give information rather than advice.

Grane Brinton

Grane Brinton,
Acting Director, R. & A. Br. London.

SECRET ✓

HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
European Theater of Operations
United States Army
(Main)

#8
Copy No. 12

APC 413
21 March 1945

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE BRANCH CHIEFS
1000 hours, Tuesday, 20 March 1945, held
in Colonel Morgan's office.

Present were: Capt. Armour (presiding) Mr. Morse (R&A)
Lt. Col. Schmidt Mr. Miller (SO)
Major Peters (OPSAF) Ens. Winton (MO)
Mr. Casey (SI) Capt. Gilpatrick (Soot)
Mr. Pearson (X-2)

I. THE RHINE FRONT.

Major Peters who has just spent a week in Cologne and the Rhineland, gave the meeting some of his personal impressions. He expressed shock and amazement at the devastation in Cologne where the few remaining buildings are badly damaged. The almost complete destruction of cities hit like Cologne, he pointed out, made such OSS activities as SOI and document collecting very difficult, where possible.

Looting by American officers and men is apparently widespread and unrestrained. There continues to be extraordinary vandalism as well as looting; only the Germans are subject to effective restrictions. There is a rapid and serious spread of spotted typhus in the Rhineland, which Army authorities are taking effective measures to control. The Germans are experiencing starvation conditions; the U.S. makes no feeding arrangements for the Germans at this time.

Major Peters encountered the T/Force in Cologne, included six R&A staff searchers and observers. Major reported these men were doing their job conscientiously under disappointing conditions.

The fact that no guides were provided by OSS for the T/Force in Cologne led to a discussion of the general of OSS participation in T/Forces. Mr. Casey stated that Branch no longer plans for SI-T/Force activities.

Major Peters reported that OSS is already getting established and spreading in Germany, in the way of taking over houses for SI, R&A, Field Photography and special X-2 activities.

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S E C R E T

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Major Peters stressed, and all concurred in, the great importance of clearly defining the responsibilities of OSS officers assigned to tasks in forward areas. OSS lines of command in the field must be clearly and firmly fixed in advance if confusion and failure is to be avoided.

II. AID TO ALLIED PRISONERS-OF-WAR IN GERMANY.

Mr. Miller informed the meeting that Brigadier Nichols (Brit.) and Col. Raymond (U.S.) have been appointed (by SHAEF) Commander and Deputy Commander respectively of the SHAEF organization to recruit, train and later direct contact and reconnaissance teams for aid to Allied P.O.W.'s in Germany. This organization is in a nebulous, formative stage according to Mr. Miller; although the requirement for 120 teams has been fixed, requests to supply personnel, particularly W/T operators, have not been filled. The staff of this organization will be bilaterally and jointly U.S. and British. In connection with this plan SHAEF is preparing a detailed study defining staff section duties, --for G-1, G-3, Bomber Command, USSTAF, etc.

Mr. Miller stated that at present the only serious commitment of OSS/ETO to aid Allied P.O.W.'s is SO's pledge to supply six teams.

III. DIPLOMATIC SITUATION IN SPAIN.

Mr. Pearson recently went to Spain for conferences in Madrid with diplomatic and British authorities on a number of X-2 problems. One serious problem was raised by the U.S. Embassy affecting SI as well as X-2, viz., control of clandestine operations on the French-Spanish Border. Mr. Pearson reported that Mr. Butterworth, formerly Charge d'Affairs and now Embassy Counsellor, approved OSS operations from bases in France, of double agents into Spain under French cover. Alternative arrangements and other types of activities, including direct contacts between OSS field personnel in Franco and Spain, were expressly prohibited. Mr. Pearson then indicated in this connection that British communications might be helpful.

Mr. Gregory (SI) reported an encouraging and satisfactory talk with the new Ambassador, who arrived in Madrid shortly before Mr. Pearson's departure. It is Mr. Pearson's impression that Ambassador Armour approves and will support SI activities in Spain as long as these activities are not directed against Spain. The Embassy plans to step up Safe Haven work.

While SI and X-2 are now the only Branches in Spain, with SI presumably closing down its activities, Ambassador Armour has expressed a definite interest in obtaining assistance from R&A. Mr. Morse stated that he was on the look-out for personnel whom R&A could employ in Spain, or to work on Spanish problems.

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Mr. Pearson noted, as a matter of particular interest to OSS future plans, the belief in Madrid that the Polish (London) and possibly other "permanently" exiled governments, might later move to Spain to stay.

IV. OSS RELATIONS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

Lt. Col. Schmidt advised the meeting of OSS negotiations with the State Department (previously referred to by Col. Forgan), which aimed at defining workable relations between OSS and the State Department abroad. Lt. Col. Schmidt urged the importance of establishing good working arrangements with the U.S. Embassies at the earliest possible date, and invited the attention of the meeting to past OSS experience in the Middle East and North Africa.

V. DURHAM PROJECT.

This project, i.e. the investigation described in last (#7) meeting, Para. VII, has made a promising beginning. Lt. Sparks (R&A) is coordinating the various assignments. Mr. Morse indicated that it would be a continuing investigation as later reactions of United Nations groups here to the San Francisco conference would be of interest.

VI. ORGANIZATION OF OSS MISSION TO GERMANY ON THE CONTINENT.

Mr. Starr (R&A), Mr. Callisen (SI) and Mr. Nichols (Sect.) then joined the meeting in a discussion of the desirability and feasibility of moving remaining OSS personnel designated for the German Mission to Paris or some other place on the continent.

The gradual movement of the U.S. Group C.C. (starting at the end of March) to Versailles and the fact that Ambassador Murphy is usually to be found at Versailles, will make SHAETF Main the central location of most important American authorities concerned with the occupation of Germany. This is of particular importance to R&A; Mr. Morse and Mr. Starr pointed out a number of advantages in moving R&A personnel to Paris or vicinity as soon as possible.

Mr. Pearson pointed out that almost all X-2 personnel for Germany were already on the continent and would continue to work into Germany through SCI Units with Armies and Army Group Hdqs.

Mr. Casey and Mr. Callisen expressed their desire to keep together the SI staff working on post-hostilities plans in Germany. The SI staff now in London can remain here and that this could be until such a time as a suitable forward staging area can be established.

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The present strains and heavy demands on OSS/ETO administrative services and communications was discussed and the meeting agreed that any large movement of personnel from London to the continent would severely tax OSS facilities. OSS/Paris is now over its personnel quota of 350 (not including X-2 and Field Photographic).

As R&A's problem seemed distinct and pressing, it was decided that Mr. Starr and Mr. Nichols would investigate the possibility of moving additional R&A personnel from London to the vicinity of Paris at an early date.

CG/hls

S E C R E T

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HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
European Theater of Operations
United States Army
(Main)

#6
Copy No. 12

APO 413
7 March 1945

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE BRANCH CHIEFS
1000 hours, Tuesday, 6 March 1945, held
in Colonel Forgan's office.

Present were: Capt. Armour (Presiding) Lt. Col. Brebner (SO)
Col. Palmer (PERSO) Lt. Col. Roller (MO)
Lt. Col. Bross Lt. Bastedo
Cdr. Katz (SI) Capt. Gilpatric (Sect)
Mr. Pearson (X-2) Lt. Shaughnessy (OPSAF)
Mr. Morse (R&A)

I. OSS MISSION TO GERMANY.

Lt. Bastedo reported on the organization and current status of the OSS Berlin Unit.

At present a total of 75 OSS personnel for the initial Berlin Unit has been approved by SHAEF; approval has been requested for additional personnel to bring the OSS total to 154 in Berlin. While this total of 75 has been provisionally sub-allocated to the various Branches, Lt. Bastedo stressed the fact that there is "fat" in the quota allowing for considerable adjustments in numbers of Branch personnel.

Mr. Pearson asked whether the number of X-2 personnel in Lt. Bastedo's figures included the SCI unit with the XV Army. He reported that discussions were in progress on the subject of SCI units with the XV Army; and that if satisfactory arrangements are made, X-2 personnel would be carried by the XV Army rather than by the OSS T/O,

Lt. Bastedo reported that in the likelihood that Russian troops will have occupied Berlin for sometime prior to the arrival of American and British troops, SHAEF no longer plans for a Berlin T/Force. This requires a Branch review of personnel previously designated for Berlin, as certain individuals designated for T/Force assignments might not be as suitable for other assignments in Berlin.

The XV Army will be a combined U.S./British Force including one U.S. and one British Division. The Commanding Officer of the XV Army, Lt. Gen. Gerow, will also be the Berlin District Commander. Lt. Bastedo believes that the XV Army will provide billeting and messing facilities for the OSS Berlin Unit.

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Liaison Section in the OSS Berlin final. Cpl. Kerr will not be available. Lt. Col. [redacted] agreed that steps should be taken to [redacted] availability, in view of the possibility that the Ambassador to Yugoslavia may wish to retain Col. [redacted] Embassy Staff at Belgrade.

Lt. Bastedo [redacted] the possibility of introducing three special OSS personnel at an advance date into Berlin and that Col. Porgan would take any decision in this regard.

Lt. Bastedo informed the meeting that the four districts constituting the U.S. Zone of occupation had been reduced to two as Army administration would find it more convenient to assign a district to each of the two U.S. Armies now contemplated for occupation responsibilities, rather than a district to Army Corps.

Lt. Bastedo reported that the decision to establish a French occupation zone will probably result in a large slice of Western Rhineland territory going to the French, but he had not received word of any new boundary definitions.

II. OSS/ETO (MAIN) CABLE TRAFFIC.

Current OSS cable traffic was summarized by Capt. Gilpatrick; an average week sees about 950 cables processed in London of which 55% are incoming. About 35% are SI cables; 10%, X-2; 5%, SO; 3%, R&A; 2%, MO; 15%, PERSO. and Adjutant; 8%, Director.

It was appreciated that the current heavy cable traffic reflects a general expansion of OSS activities and that while Branches may effect some economy in cables by compressing verbiage, combining messages to the same destination, and using pouch where possible, only a minor reduction in the total is feasible.

Mr. Morse suggested that telephone communications with OSS/Paris might be a substitute for cables. Lt. Col. Gross will investigate the present use of telephones to the continent and if desirable will arrange for more frequent calls, allocated to various London Branches and offices.

III. SHAEP MISSIONS.

Capt. Armour read to the meeting amendments to the basic directive to Heads of SHAEP Missions to various liberated countries, signed by Chief of Staff, SHAEP, 22 February 1945. The amendment modifies a function of the SHAEP Missions which directly bears upon OSS Missions to the same countries. The

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amendment reads:

"You will be the authorizing and screening agency when commands subordinate to the Supreme Headquarters wish to make contact with the Norwegian (French--Belgian) Government. However, on administrative matters a subordinate Headquarters, having established an original contact through the Mission, is permitted to deal with the appropriate branch of the Government with or without the continued participation or assistance of the Mission though the latter must be kept informed of the general course of the more important negotiations. When matters of policy arise or when problems reach a ministerial level you will be the only channel between commands subordinate to Supreme Headquarters and the Norwegian (French--Belgian) Government."

IV. OSS USE OF GERMAN PERSONNEL.

Mr. Pearson directed the attention of the meeting to the desirability of formulating a definite policy on the use of enemy defections. Reference was made to Bern cables 5527 and 6807 to London and London-Bern 3387. (Distribution of those cables is highly restricted.)

There was considerable discussion of the political, security and intelligence implications of offering any type of assurance or enticement to enemy defectors. The meeting decided not to recommend to Washington that a specific OSS policy on exploiting enemy defections should be formulated and issued.

One reason for this decision was that receipt of such a formal policy in certain Missions and Field Stations might lead to thinking and making of awkward commitments which otherwise might not be provoked.

CG/hs

SECRET

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HQ & HQ DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
European Theater of Operations
United States Army
(Main)

#5
Copy No. 12

APC 413
27 February 1945

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE BRANCH CHIEFS'
1000 hours, Tuesday, 27 February 1945, held
in Colonel Forgan's office.

Present were: Col. Forgan (Presiding) Lt. Cdr. Katz (SI)
Captain Armour Mr. Pearson (X-2)
Mr. Hugh Wilson Mr. Evans (R&A)
Col. W.C. Jackson (OPSAF) Mr. Miller (SO)
Col. W.H. Jackson Lt. Col. Roller (MO)
Col. Palmer (PERSO) Lt. Armistead (FP)
Capt. Gilpatric (Sect)

I. OSS AID TO PRISONERS-OF-WAR.

Mr. Miller gave a report on the status of OSS plans to aid Allied P/Ws in Germany.

In the past difficulties have arisen from the lack of coordination among the various Commands concerned, and from the lack of satisfactory intelligence on locations and conditions in P/W camps. At present SHAEF is assuming the responsibility for the general plan which provides for parachuting teams (1 off., 1 NCO & 1 W/T operator) into the vicinity of selected P/W camps, for the purpose of establishing communications, furnishing spot intelligence, calling for air supplies or special assistance, and assisting in organization of Allied P/Ws as the situation requires. SHAEF initially requested 100 teams; SOE has committed 12 teams and SO (OSS) has committed 6 teams. The French (DGER), Belgian and Polish will be counted on to fill requirements for the other teams.

SHAEF will hold a meeting shortly with interested agencies to finalize the required number of teams and plans for their training and operational employment.

Mr. Miller reported a recent meeting with representatives of DGER, SIS and SOE on the DEVON scheme. This scheme is designed to facilitate collection of intelligence on French deportees and labor camps in Germany; it will be implemented by a standing committee located in Paris on which DGER (Col. Manuel), SI, SO, SIS and SOE will be represented. This scheme may also provide useful intelligence on Allied P/Ws in Germany.

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II. OSS MISSIONS TO NORWAY AND DENMARK.

Col. Wm. C. Jackson reviewed the present status of KITTEN (OSS Mission to Norway) and HANSEL (OSS Mission to Denmark). SI, X-2, R&A and Communications have already designated individuals to serve in these two missions. SO personnel will participate in the OSS mission only when the SPMQ Detachments to Norway and Denmark--including SO personnel--have been dissolved.

Col. Forgan recalled the basic directive of SCAEF giving general authorization for OSS to send Missions into liberated territories and subsequently notifying the appropriate SHAEF missions.

KITTEN and HANSEL will be fully coordinated with military authorities (SCOTCO, DANFORCE, etc.), SHAEF and U.S. diplomatic authorities.

An OSS group including representatives of SI, R&A and SO have had three formal meetings with the U.S. Ambassador to Norway, Mr. Osborne. Mr. Pearson stated that X-2 desires to participate in this group; X-2 will intensify efforts to recruit suitable individuals for KITTEN and HANSEL.

III. XV US ARMY:

Col. W.C. Jackson informed the meeting that while the Command (Lt. Gen. Gerow) and staff of the XV Army have been established, the strength and composition of this Army are not now known. The XV Army will be an occupational force, assigned to Berlin, and will probably relieve Armies now operating on the Rhine Front.

X-2 has organized an SCI Unit to be attached to the XV Army. This unit will include 2 off. and 3 EM. Col. Forgan pointed out the desirability of SI liaison with this Army; Col. W.H. Jackson suggested that the best approach might be through the OSS Det. at 12 A.G. to the XV Army Staff. Col. Forgan will discuss this question with Gen. Sibert this week.

IV. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF PRISONER-OF-WAR INTELLIGENCE.

Col. Forgan read a memo from Lt. Deston, R&A, reviewing the present machinery for distributing secret and top secret P.O.W. intelligence, and recommending that the CID (Central Information Division), R&A Branch, be formally designated as the office in OSS to accession and distribute all such intelligence. The single exception would be top secret CSDIC reports which will continue to be handled through present top secret control channels. All concurred.

a. In the desirability of having a single point for the accessioning and distribution of P/W intelligence material and--

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b. That CID (R&A) would be the appropriate office to take the responsibility.

Mr. Evans stated that no changes would be made where present distribution of documents was found to be satisfactory. Col. Palmer observed that R&A will require additional staff personnel to handle the large number of P.O.W. documents coming into OSS daily.

V. USE OF CABLES.

Col. Forgan stated there has been a steady and unwarranted increase of cable traffic in OSS/ETO, e.g. on 30 Jan. the Message Center processed 291 messages (25,071 groups). Col. Forgan read a letter from Mr. O'Gara in Washington requesting, at least in personnel matters, that we "use the pouch in every possible case and reserve the cable for real urgency".

Col. Forgan directed the Secretariat to review the present use of cables. At the next meeting of the Branch Chiefs, Capt. Gilpatrick will present proposals to effect reduction of cable traffic.

VI. OSS LIAISON OFFICERS.

Col. Forgan read to the meeting a memo from OPSAL, 15 Feb., nominating certain officers as senior OSS liaison officers to 6 foreign Governments. This memo recommended that a senior OSS liaison officer should be responsible "for keeping the SSO informed of any crucial developments affecting our relationship with a particular Government or agency, for coordinating liaison established by the various Branches at lower levels, and for holding periodic meetings between the various Branch liaison officers who have established contacts...."

It was agreed that senior liaison officers would be effective for OSS/London rather than for OSS/ETO. On the continent Major VanderGracht, Lt. Col. Coster and Lt. Col. Carter will continue to be the liaison with Dutch Groups, the Belgian Government and the French Government respectively. In OSS/London, Lt. Col. Dasher and Major Katek will continue to be the OSS liaison officers with the Polish-Government-in-Exile and Czech Government respectively.

Mr. Pearson nominated Mr. De Hartog to be OSS/London liaison with the Dutch Government.

Capt. Armour will be responsible for formalizing these appointments, where desirable; he will also appoint senior OSS liaison officers to the Norwegian Government in London and to representatives of Danish Resistance.

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VII. OSS RUSSIAN LIAISON SECTION.

Col. Forgan stated that Washington had concurred in the transfer of Lt. Col. Thayer from M/T0, at a later date, to be the head of the OSS Russian Liaison Section in Germany. Pending Lt. Col. Thayer's assignment, Col. Forgan desires a Russian Liaison Section to be organized here, the Staff of which will include representatives of various Branches. Mr. Evans queried the relation of the U.S.S.R. Div. of the R&A Branch to the proposed Russian Liaison Section, as Russian political analysts would have to be provided by R&A, Washington.

Col. Palmer will be responsible for recruiting suitable personnel for the OSS Russian Liaison Section.

VIII. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS.

Col. W.C. Jackson said that many recommendations for decorations have been made by SO and SI. Only one recommendation has been forwarded by MO, and none by X-2 and R&A.

After considerable discussion, it was agreed that X-2 and R&A will review the position of their personnel in the light of OSS and ETOUSA regulations and practices to determine what recommendations should be presented to the Awards & Decorations Board OSS/ETO at an early date.

Col. Forgan stressed the importance of effecting recommendations for awards and decorations, if possible, through regular Army channels, originating with Army Commands to which OSS personnel were attached in the field.

IX. NEW CHIEF, FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC BRANCH.

Col. Forgan announced that Lt. Mark Armistead, USNR, will relieve Lt. Cdr. Sponser as the Chief of the Field Photographic Branch, OSS/ETO. He warmly commended Lt. Armistead on the outstanding work accomplished by Lt. Armistead and his crew of photographers in the Intelligence Documentation Photographic Project. This project, conceived and executed by the Geographic Div (R&A) and Field Photographic under Lt. Armistead's direction, aims to provide photographic coverage of strategic facilities, installations and Areas, in Europe.

CG/hls

SECRET

Administrative Office 11064A

SECRET

ROUTING SHEET

INFORMATION

Originator Via Secretariat
 Date 2/26/44
 Addressee _____
 Date Rec'd _____

Subject: MEMO to Gen. Donovan from Gen. Brinton, and to Brinton from V. Hooten
Re: Max London

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd	Comments
Dr. Langer	Annex	<i>3/17</i>	
Gen. Magruder	Cent. <i>3/b</i>	<i>3/17</i>	
Planning Group	Cent. <i>4/8</i>	<i>3/10</i>	
ETO	South	<i>3/10</i>	
E.J. Rutzell	Adm.		
Mrs. O'Donnell	Adm.		





BY HAND

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10 February 1944

SECRET

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

To: General Donovan
From: Crane Brinton C.B.

In view of the discussion of yesterday afternoon, it has been agreed that R&A London (and R&A Continent of Europe) will continue or assume responsibility for the development of the following activities:

1. Servicing certain OSS operations, notably SO and MO, with respect to target selection and appraisal.
2. Servicing the Army (including Civil Affairs work), the Navy and the Air Force.
3. Servicing the U. S. Embassy in London (and on the Continent) as officers of the State Department in Washington or abroad may direct.
4. Developing at the working level and to the fullest extent possible the PWE-OSS arrangement which is essential if many of the ends foreseen above are to be achieved.

N.B. Unless R&A can pull its weight in the PWE-OSS partnership, it will be in the embarrassing position of contributing little more than its name to one of SHAEF's chief strategic projects. R&A would face the additional embarrassment of having to depend upon PWE to perform many of the activities included in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 above.

5. Furnishing personnel for the forward OSS teams which are to accompany the Army and which will serve both Army and rear intelligence.

N.B. It should be noted, however, that SHAEF has apparently delegated to PWE the task of recruiting, training and directing Political Survey Officers in the function of gathering intelligence for psychological warfare and Civil Affairs administration. PWE is to have a large part in this task and has invited R&A to share the task with it on an equal basis. The teams of Political Survey Officers are to service the Appreciation Section of SHAEF. In case SHAEF does not revise the directives which govern the contemplated PSO arrangement, the question of R&A participation in both OSS and PSO teams may prove a difficult one to settle. If OSS personnel is to function effectively in sharing with PWE analysis of the material gathered by PSO's, it should also share with PWE in the recruitment, training and direction of the PSO's. No matter what the decision, however, additional personnel will be required.

-2-

SECRET

6. Furnishing personnel for future European advance posts, which should be contemplated for at least most of the following: Paris, Brussels-The Hague, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Berlin, Munich, Bordeaux (?), and Lyon (?).

N.B. Personnel designated for any of these posts will profit greatly by spending time in London where they may familiarize themselves with inter-Allied control agencies and sources of hot information.

In terms of the above, R&A London (and the Continent) will almost certainly require personnel in larger quantities than the Bodman memorandum of 29 January 1944 (relevant portions attached) stipulates.

a. For France.

On the spot and in sight - 6 professionals.

Needed - at least another 6 professionals and 3 typists.

Needed also - such Topographical Intelligence, EOU, and Malenbaum staff as their respective chiefs may later be required to furnish.

b. For Low Countries.

On the spot and in sight - 2 (possibly 3) professionals.

Needed - at least another 4 professionals and 2 typists.

Needed also (as above).

c. For Germany (and Central Europe ?).

On the spot and in sight - 11 professionals.

Needed - at least another 12 professionals and 5 typists.

In this office, even with the help of Kent and Despres, we are unable to appraise the work-commitments of R&A Washington, which must influence the assignment of staff veterans to London and the Continent. But we can name at least certain of the persons whose tasks would be ready for them on arrival here provided that activities 3, 4, 5 and 6 above develop along the lines now contemplated. These persons are as follows:

General: Kent, Winnaeker.

France: Hill, Franck, Douglas.

Low Countries: Spoelhof, Velleman, and Lt. James Kronthal of FNB if he can be obtained with the good will of FNB.

Germany: (and Central Europe ?): Anderson, Franz Neumann, Marcuse, Johnson, Meyer, Krieger, Williamson, Schmid, Herz, Lewis, Tins (?), Helen Fisher (?).

(This list does not take into consideration individuals of whom this office has little or no personal knowledge).

Should the Civil Affairs work in Washington reach a point where Holborn could be spared, he would be very valuable here.

CONFIDENTIALCOPYOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

29 January 1944

To: Mr. Crane Brinton
 From: Violet Bodman
 Subject: Report #3.

I. Transportation

Immediately following the last report to you, transportation to London closed down. For three weeks no one has left, in spite of the strongest pressure we could bring to bear. As of this date, shipments are beginning to move again, although somewhat slowly.

The following personnel leave for the Port tomorrow.

Harold Deutsch	PW	Pvt. Robert Rosa	EOU
2nd Lt. Albert Hill	EOU	Pvt. Arthur Stuart	EOU
2nd Lt. Mark Kahn	EOU	T/L Robert Neumann	PW

The following are on the alert (with no estimate on date of departure).

2nd Lt. James O. Shea	EOU	T/5 Hans Meyerhoff	PW
S 2/c Frank Lowenstein	EOU	Pvt. Morris Janowitz	PW
Lt. (jg) Kenyon Poole	EOU or	Pvt. Val Lorwin	PW
	GIU	Henry Sterling	TI
Lt. Edward Dickinson	EOU-SO	Roger Dow	TI
Pvt. Eugene Drucker	PW	Lt. Fred Foster	Map

Transportation has been requested for the following.

Ensign John C. Sparks	Curtels	Pvt. J. L. Houghteling, Jr.	TI
Pvt. Rudy Finold	PW	Ernst Kitzinger	TI
*Richard Baker	PW	Ensign Kirk Stone	TI
Capt. Gordon Stewart	PW	*Wilfred Malenbaum	Malenbaum
Felix Gilbert	PW	Pvt. Carl Auerbach	Map
*Pvt. Jack Kaplan	Malenbaum	Oswald Schmidt	Map
*David Grove	"	Demetra Aston	EOU
*Gladya Frisch	"	Pvt. Harold Barger	USSR
*Ruth Amende	"	Ens. Alfred Skerpan	

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

Lt. (jg) Leonard Wilson left by air yesterday. Seidlin and Eitner for PW are still pending assignment. By agreement with Kindloberger, Pvt. Charles Mayer is to be retained here.

We have just compiled the transportation estimates for the month of March. The Division Chiefs expect to send about 23 people to London during that month, some of whom have already been designated for travel (their names are starred on the above list), and others who are not yet selected. The total number of personnel to be moved to London from now through the end of March is 52.

II. Secretarial Help.

15 Nov 1943

Red Putzall -

This is the original document
submitted to Genl Davis Staff
and has been passed through
War Department and returned
to us. I imagine it should
be placed on file with the
Secretariat. Nearly Officer
has a copy.

Em

Secret

1st W/Ind.

HQ & HQ DET, OSS, Room 100, North Bldg., Washington, D. C.
10 November 1943.

TO: Mr. Jerry Miller.

13, 916.
London Mission

x Personnel/Hub

A T / A

Forwarded as a matter pertaining to your office.

For the Commanding Officer:



H. H. OLIVER,
Major, C.A.C.,
Executive Officer.

Incl.
Supplementary Table of Allotment.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
1st W/Ind.
HQ & HQ DET, OSS, Room 100, North Bldg., Washington, D. C.
10 November 1943.

TO: Mr. Jerry Miller.

Forwarded as a matter pertaining to your office.
For the Commanding Officer:

R. H. OLIVER,
Major, C.A.C.,
Executive Officer.

Incl.
Supplementary Table of Allotment.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

HQ. SERVICES OF SUPPLY
MILITARY PERSONNEL DIVISION

SPCAS 320.2 ETO (9 Oct 43)

DISPOSITION FORM
Room 4B 486

23 October 1943

SUBJECT Supplementary Table of Allotment.

TO:C/S Army-Thru G-1, WDGSOpns Div	XX Office of Strategic Services
CG SOSTng DivTAG
C/S SOSCiv Pers DivJAG
DCS Reqm & ResosBud & Fin DivFin
Proc & Distr DivReqm DivPMG
Cons DivDef Aid DivSpec Serve
Pub Rel & Inf DivResos DivArmy Ex Serv
Adm DivAdm ServsChaplain
		QMG
			XX Rm 112 North Bldg.
			Washington, D.C.

FOR:S/W directsComment or concurrenceNecessary action
CG directsRemark and recommendationInformation for reply
Draft of replyInviting attention toInd. approved
Direct replySee notation of.....	XX Primary interest
ApprovedInformationNotation and return
DisapprovedConsult.....
FileCompliance

For the Commanding General:

Russel B. Reynolds
Lt. Col., T. A.
Active, Strength Authorization Br.

RUSSEL B. REYNOLDS
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps
Director, Military Personnel Division

1 Incl.
TAG IAS, 20 Oct 43,
to Dir. MPD, ASF, w/1 Incl.

24-13682

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10593

WAR DEPARTMENT
 SERVICES OF SUPPLY
 OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL BSK/mjm 2B-939 Pentagon

INFORMAL ACTION SHEET

File No. AG 320.2 (9 Oct 43)OE-S

 To be filed ☐
 Not to be filed ☐

20 October, 1943

Subject Supplementary Table of Allotment.
 From Operations Branch, S & C Section
 (Branch or division)

2B-939
 (Room number)

Pentagon
 (Building)

3344
 (Telephone number)

 To: 1. Director, Military Personnel Division, ASE
 (Branch or division) (Room number)

(Building)

(Attention)

2.

(Branch or division)

(Room number)

(Building)

(Attention)

For:

10-20481 1

1 Incl.

Ltr. frm O.S.S. Detachment, Hqs. ETOUSA, 9 Oct 43, To: CG, Hq ETOUSA, w/1st Ind. &

1 Incl.

Historical
DR
SECRET

SECRET

10593

O.S.S. DETACHMENT
HEADQUARTERS, ETOUSA

9th Oct. 1943.

SUBJECT: Supplementary Table of Allotment.**TO :** The Commanding General, Hq. ETOUSA.**THROUGH:** The Ass't. Chief of Staff G-2, Hq. ETOUSA.

1. It is requested that authority be granted for the O.S.S. Detachment to increase its Table of Allotment to provide for the personnel required to activate the operational plans which have been approved by the Commanding General, Hq. ETOUSA.

2. It should be noted that the grades and ratings set forth in this request are not chargeable to the Tables of Allotment of non-Tables of Organization grades and ratings approved for ETOUSA. The O.S.S. personnel are charged against a Global Table of Allotment established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assigned to the Director, O.S.S., Washington headquarters.

3. A flow chart showing the transportation schedule requested for the personnel concerned will be submitted later.

4. In the following paragraphs are listed the personnel required for the operation of the plans, for the training of the operatives, and for the administration and maintenance of the special units. Attached is a summary table showing the total additional personnel required by grades and ratings.

5. The plan for coordination of resistance elements in occupied territories was contained in letter of recommendation from the A. C. of S. G-5, subject "Direction and Support of Resistance Groups in Enemy Occupied Countries Subsequent to the Initiation of Operations on the Continent," dated 17 July 1943, and was approved by the Commanding General, Hq. ETOUSA, in letter of 29 August, 1943, subject "Coordination of Activities Behind the Enemy Lines."

6. The plan stated above consists of the following elements:

a. S.O. JEDEBURGH PLAN, which is to be carried out in conjunction with the British S.O.E. organization and requires the following personnel:

(1) JEDEBURGH teams, totaling 50, of 3 men each. The Fighting French will provide one member of each team, which reduces the O.S.S. requirement by 50 officers.

- 1 -

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Ltr subj "Supplementary Table of Allotment" to CG ETOUSA thru AG of S
G-2 ETOUSA 9th Oct. 1943.

Majors.....10
Captains.....20
1st Lieutenants.....20
Total Officers.....50

Master Sergeants.....50
Total Enlisted Men.....50

(2) For instructors of JEDBURGH teams:

Captains.....10

(3) For Administrative Officer,
JEDBURGH teams:

1st Lieutenants..... 1

b. Special Staffs at Army Group and Army Headquarters.
(Explanation of the functions and assignments of these
Special Staffs was set forth in memorandum of 22 Sept. 1943
to the Commanding General, Hq. ETOUSA.)

Colonels..... 3
Majors..... 3
Captains.....19
1st Lieutenants..... 8
Total Officers.....33

Master Sergeants..... 3
Technicians 3rd Gr..... 3
Technicians 4th Gr..... 6
Technicians 5th Gr..... 6
Privates First Class..... 9
Total Enlisted Men.....27

g. Special Staff for assignment to COBSAG:

Majors..... 1
Captains..... 1
Total Officers..... 2

d. Personnel at S.O.-S.O.E. Headquarters for joint con-
trol of JEDBURGH teams and resistance groups:

Lieut. Colonel..... 3
Majors.....10
Captains.....22
1st Lieutenants..... 4
Total Officers.....39

- 2 -

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SECRET

Ltr subj "Supplementary Table of Allotment" to CG ETOUSA thru AG of S
G-2 ETOUSA 9th Oct. 1943.

g. Groups of operatives -- Danish. The personnel listed below is that required for the Danish nationality group of operatives for plans to be carried out in conjunction with S.O.E.:

Captains..... 1
1st Lieutenants..... 3
Total Officers..... 4

Technical Sergeants..... 2
Technicians 3rd Gr..... 6
Technicians 5th Gr..... 22
Total Enlisted Men..... 30

7. The personnel listed in the paragraphs below are required for the S.I. SUSSEX PLAN which is to be operated in conjunction with the British S.I.S. organization. Approval of the plan was contained in first indorsement, Hq. ETOUSA, 5 Oct. 1943, to outline entitled "Project No. 2 -- OSS (Joint Training Program) July 5, 1943," and first indorsement, Hq. ETOUSA, 5 Oct. 1943, to letter, Office of Strategic Services, 16 August 1943, subject "OSS Agent Recruiting Programme."

a. For Special Field Staff and Liaison:

Colonels..... 1
Lieut. Colonels..... 2
Majors..... 4
Captains..... 4
1st Lieutenants..... 6
2nd Lieutenants..... 6
Total Officers..... 23

b. For agents:

2nd Lieutenants..... 12
Master Sergeants..... 2
Technical Sergeants..... 2
Technicians 3rd Gr..... 4
Technicians 4th Gr..... 5
Technicians 5th Gr..... 8
Privates First Class..... 24
Total Enlisted Men..... 45

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr subj "Supplementary Table of Allotment" to CG ETOUSA thru AC of S
G-2 ETOUSA
9th Oct. 1943.

g. For training of the operatives:

Majors..... 2
Captains..... 4
1st Lieutenants..... 8
Total Officers..... 14

Master Sergeants..... 1
Technical Sergeants..... 1
Technicians 3rd Gr..... 5
Technicians 4th Gr..... 3
Technicians 5th Gr..... 1
Total Enlisted Men..... 11

8. The personnel required to establish and maintain the necessary communications for the above plans are listed below:

Captains..... 1
1st Lieutenants..... 2
Total Officers..... 3

Technical Sergeants..... 3
Technicians 3rd Gr..... 7
Technicians 4th Gr..... 27
Technicians 5th Gr..... 17
Total Enlisted Men..... 54

9. Personnel for administration, housing and maintenance of the additional personnel and installations required by the above plans are as follows:

Master Sergeants..... 5
Technicians 3rd Gr..... 10
Technicians 4th Gr..... 27
Technicians 5th Gr..... 28
Privates First Class..... 25
Privates..... 52
Total Enlisted Men..... 147

10. Personnel to establish Maritime Branch for training of Norwegian and Danish groups of operatives and other personnel such as Jedburghs and agents in small boat and maritime operations:

NAVAL PERSONNEL
Lt. Commander..... 1
Lieutenant..... 1
Lieutenant (jg)..... 1
Total Naval Officer Personnel..... 3

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr subj "Supplementary Table of Allotment" to CG STOMA thru AG of S
 C-2 STOMA 9th Oct. 1943.

Chief Boatswain's Mate..... 1
 Boatswain's Mate 2/o..... 1
 Electrician's Mate 1/o..... 1
 Machinist's Mate 1/o..... 1
 Fireman 1/o..... 1
 Carpenter's Mate 3/o..... 1
 Yeoman 1/o..... 2
 Yeoman 3/o..... 1
 Seaman 1/o..... 2
 Seaman AB..... 2
 Total Naval Enlisted Personnel.....13

MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL

Captains..... 1
 Lieutenants..... 1
 Total Marine Corps Officer Personnel..... 2

Platoon Sergeants..... 1
 Sergeants..... 1
 Corporals..... 1
 Privates..... 2
 Total Marine Corps Enlisted Personnel.... 5

11. Summary:

a. Army Personnel.....55
 b. Naval Personnel..... 16
 g. Marine Corps Personnel.....7
 Grand Total.....578

C. S. Vanderblue
 C. S. Vanderblue,
 Colonel, SC,
 Commanding.

1 Incl:
 Supplementary Table of
 Allotment (#1A - Army)
 (#1B - Navy & Marine Corps)

- 5 -
SECRET

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(Ltr, OSS Det, Hq ETOUSA, 9 Oct 43, subj: Supplementary Table of Allotment)

AG 221 MDA

1st Ind.

RPT/PSL/rls

Hq ETOUSA - 16 October 1943

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.
2. This request for supplementary grades and ratings is believed to be commensurate with the mission to be performed.
3. Although the proportion of higher noncommissioned grades, particularly that of master sergeants, appears somewhat high, it is believed that the highly technical and secret nature of the operations involved justifies the break down as requested.
4. It is the understanding of this headquarters, as stated in paragraph 2 of the basic communication, that the grades and ratings involved are not to be charged against the theater overhead allotment.

DL AGO

For the Commanding General:

OCT 19 1943

RECEIVED

1 Incl: n/c

Richard P. Fisk
 RICHARD P. FISK,
 Lt. Colonel, A.G.C.,
 Assistant Adjutant General.

16 OCT 1943

43280

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SWC

SECRETSUPPLEMENTARY TABLE OF ALLOCATIONS, C.S.S., DETACHMENT, HQ, ETOUSA

	Plans for Control Resistance Groups	SUSSEX PLAN	Communi- cations	Services	Total
Colonels	3	1			4
Lieut. Colonels	3	2			5
Majors	24	6			30
Captains	73	8	1		82
1st Lieutenants	36	14	2		52
2nd Lieutenants		18			18
Total Officers	139	49	3		191
Master Sergeants	53	3		5	61
Technical Sergeants	2	3	3		8
Technicians 3rd Gr.	9	9	7	10	35
Technicians 4th Gr.	6	8	27	27	68
Technicians 5th Gr.	28	9	17	28	82
Privates First Class	9	24		25	58
Privates				52	52
Total Allisted Men	107	56	54	147	364
AGGREGATE	246	105	57	147	555

Incl. 1A - Army personnel

SECRET

SECRET**RECOMMENDATION TABLE OF ALLOCATIONS, U.S.S. DETACHMENT, EL. FIJUNA**

MARITIME BRANCH	NAVAL PERSONNEL	MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL	TOTAL
Lt. Commander	1		1
Captains		1	1
Lieutenants	1	1	2
Lieutenants (ig)	1		1
Total Officer Personnel for Maritime Br.	3	2	5
Platoon sergeants		1	1
Sergeants		1	1
Corporals		1	1
Privates		2	2
Chief Boatswain's Mate	1		1
Boatswain's Mate 2/c	1		1
Electrician's Mate 1/c	1		1
Machinist's Mate 1/c	1		1
Fireman 1/c	1		1
Carpenter's Mate 3/c	1		1
Yeoman 1/c	2		2
Yeoman 3/c	1		1
Seaman 1/c	2		2
Seaman AB	2		2
Total Enlisted Personnel for Maritime Branch	13	5	18
AGGREGATE	16	7	23
Incl. 1B - Naval & Marine Corps Personnel			

SECRET

*London Office 1265-2 -
reference, 1270001*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Col. G. Edward Buxton
FROM: C. M. Stairs *Jr.*
SUBJECT: Services - London

17 September 1943

*See also GIBLIN
12,152 -*

The attached order, issued by Col. Bruce to activate the Services Branch in London, agrees in all important points with our plans here and the organization actually functioning in North Africa and Middle East Theaters. It is quite contrary to the proposed organization as presented to us by Col. Vanderblue.

The principal point to be determined is the appointment of what we call a Services Officer and Col. Bruce calls Chief of the Services Branch.

In Order No. 16, Col. Bruce names Lt. Col. Walter M. GIBLIN Acting Chief of the Services Branch and states in his cable #15181:

"4. Since I propose to assign GIBLIN as permanent Services Chief, it is impossible to release him for assignment as Washington Theater Operations Officer. My proposal, of course, is subject to the approval of the Director."

The attached record and correspondence indicate that Col. GIBLIN is a capable officer, but General Donovan's note on my memo of 7 August states clearly that he cannot be used in the European Theater.

Naturally, I would prefer to select the Services Officer if I am going to be responsible for the functioning of Services in ETO. Col. GIBLIN does not know our organization or policies here and, of course, would not feel any personal responsibility or loyalty to me.

Based on the General's definite statement, Col. GIBLIN cannot be considered.

I would like to try to get Col. Bruce's approval of Lt. Col. Henry C. Willcox (papers attached) as Services Officer. I feel sure his experience indicates that he would be an excellent executive.

*See attached note of new
development and this was written
C.M.S.*

Col. Buxton

- 2 -

17 September 1943

I am attaching a proposed cable to Col. Bruce for your consideration.

It is imperative that we have a good Services Officer in London at a very early date.

Attachments

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 September 1943

TO: Col. Buxton

Since this memo was dictated, Col. Hoag has asked me talk with Lt. Col. Charles Wolff, and I have had a talk with Col. Wolff. From many points of view it might be better to suggest Col. Wolff as Services Officer if we can get him. He served in France in the last war and has had about 22 years of excellent business experience. He has recently been with the Army Navy Munitions Board and has had his heart set on going overseas. He is very much interested in the possibility of a connection with OSS, partly because he has known Col. Vanderblue in business for some years.

I was in college with Col. Wolff but have seen him only once or twice during the intervening years. I am sure that he has executive ability, and I believe that if we suggest him as Services Officer to Col. Bruce, with reference to the Vanderblue acquaintance, it might solve a number of our problems. It certainly seems more reasonable that Col. Bruce would not be so likely to resent our insistence on appointing the Services Officer if we have found a man who would be welcomed by his Executive Officer, Col. Vanderblue.

In view of this later development, I have redrafted the proposed cable which is attached for your consideration.

C. M. S. Jr.

Proposed cable to Bruce from Buxton:

Re your Order No. 16 and cable 15181 General Donovan stated definitely that Giblin cannot be used in the European Theater.

Sears recommends and I approve choice of Lt. Col. Charles Wolff as Chief, Services Branch. Wolff has had a long administrative career and has been a most successful executive. He served in France in the last war and has recently been on duty with the Army Navy Munitions Board. Wolff is known to Col. Vanderblue.

Believe it essential that Services Officer have brief period of training here and then be sent to London earliest possible date. If you agree we will proceed to get Wolff transferred to us.

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

ORDER NO. 16

SUBJECT: ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTION OF
SERVICES BRANCH, LONDON MISSION, OSS

Issued : 10 Sept 1943

Effective: 10 Sept 1943

1. The Services Branch, London Mission, Office of Strategic Services, is, effective this date, established for the purpose of organization and direction of administrative management of Office of Strategic Service's activities in the European Theater under the direction and control of the Chief of Services Branch as indicated.
2. Lieut. Col. Walter V. Giblin, AUS, in addition to his other duties is designated as acting Chief of the Services Branch, London Mission, Office of Strategic Services.
3. In order to facilitate the operations and functions of the activities of the Service Branch, the following sections are established within the branch:

Headquarters Detachment
Budget and Finance Section
Civilian Personnel Section
Procurement and Supply Section
Motor Transportation Section
Maintenance and Repair Section
Country House Administration Section.

4. The functions and duties to be conducted by the sections established in the preceding paragraph, are set forth as follows:

a. Headquarters Detachment:

- (1) Procurement of military personnel in accordance with existing regulations.
- (2) Maintenance of central office of records and administration for all military personnel, training, administration and supply of Headquarters Detachment.
- (3) Arrangement for and preparation of travel orders, warrants and leave orders for military personnel.
- (4) Arrangements for and preparation of travel orders and warrants for civilian personnel.

5. The duties set forth in paragraph 4 above are assigned to the Services Branch to enable the operating branches to be free from administrative duties. It shall be the responsibility of each Branch Chief to coordinate all such matters pertaining to his Section with the proper agency as prescribed in paragraph 4 above.

6. In order to facilitate the organization of the Services Branch and to promote efficiency in the operation of its activities all policies heretofore established which are in conflict with these instructions are revoked.

By order of Colonel BRUCE:

DISTRIBUTION:

Director, OSS, Wash., - 2
 Ea Branch, OSS, Wash., 2 - 20
 Ea Branch, OSS, London 4 - 40
 Ea Officer, OSS, London 1 - 80
 CG, ETO (G-2), - 2
 FILE - 50

- 11-24 *[Signature]*
 F. R. COURTRIGHT
 Captain, AUS,
 Adjutant.

London Office 12572
 x Planning Group
 x Plans

SECRET

Planning Group

Maj. O. O. Doering, Secretariat

4 September 1943

Executive Officer, OSB Planning Group

**Transmission of Psychological Warfare Plans to
 London Office**

Colonel Vanderblue has requested that the London Office be furnished with copies of plans which have been approved by the Planning Group for all countries in the European Theater of Operations, as well as other areas which are governed by governments-in-exile resident in London.

The Planning Group has recommended that this request should be approved. *on condition of suggestion only*

Accordingly, the following plans and implementation studies are forwarded herewith:

P. O. #25/1	-	Copy No. 15	-	Special Plan for Crete and Dodecanese
#23/2	-	" "	24	- Implementation Study for Crete and Dodecanese
#27/1	-	" "	26	- Special Plan for Balkans
#21/1	-	" "	16	- Special Plan for The Netherlands
#21/3	-	" "	10	- Target Study for the Netherlands
#22/1	-	" "	16	- Special Plan for Belgium
#30/1	-	" "	16	- Special Plan for France
#31/1	-	" "	16	- Special Plan for Southern France

A. H. Onthank,
 Colonel, MI

AHO/srh
 attachments
 cc: Dr. Rogers
 Directorate's Office

London Office - 12, 270
X Ship X Norway
(25) X Stephenson, W. S.
X British Security Coord.

26 August 1943

Mr. W. S. Stephenson
British Security Co-ordination
1106 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of 11
August 1943 transmitting the message from
London. We have replied direct to our
London office.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

THRUN:BLACK

London Office 12.270
 x Ships
 x Norway
 x Stephenson
 x British Security Coord.



BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION

EXECUTIVE 5800
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

1106 Connecticut Avenue
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

URGENT

BY SAFE HAND

11th August, 1943.

Dear Bill,

To Carl Stephenson

The following has just arrived for you from
 London:

QUOTE

- A. Reference our discussion on suitable fast craft for Shetland Island Norwegian traffic.
- B. Your office telegraphed O.S.S. London particulars of three vessels of which U.S.A. Navy 110 feet sub-chaser most suitable.
- C. Despite appearance there would be no need to alter to resemble Norwegian fishing vessel. Sub-chaser is similar in appearance to our D. class M.T.B. which has successfully hidden off Norwegian Coast for several days.
- D. Despite service on which vessels at present employed, would urge you strongly to support application for three 110 feet vessels as they are only suitable vessels here or in bad weather off major part of Norwegian Coast.
- E. Although would like three vessels, in view of shortage of time, one is better than none.

UNQUOTE

General W. J. Donovan,
 Director, Office of Strategic
 Services,
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Yours ever
Bice
 W. S. STEPHENSON

Replied to by cable to Bruce from Comdr.
Woolley dated 17 August 1943.